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COMMENT
Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow
Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s
Purpose*
I. Introduction
In the summer of 1991, a thirty-nine-year-old man spotted a young woman
walking on the street, got out of his car, and struck her on the head from
behind, rendering her unconscious.1 He then transported her to a downtown
parking garage where he raped her, forced her to perform oral sodomy, and
robbed her of her jewelry and money. He was tried and convicted of rape and
robbery in the first degree in a South Dakota state court and sentenced to
seven years in prison. He was not required to register as a sex offender, as
South Dakota did not enact a sex offender registration law until 1994.2
After release from prison, this man moved to Arizona where he was later
convicted of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of eighteen and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Arizona state penitentiary.
Pursuant to Arizona’s sex offender laws, he was required to register as a sex
offender in Arizona before being released from prison. In addition, he signed
a Notice of Sex Offender/ Change of Address Registration Requirements
document that stated, “I understand that if I leave the country or state and
move to another country or state, I am under the obligation to notify, in
writing, the sheriff of the county from which I am moving within 72 hours.”
In January 2006 he moved to Colorado and failed to notify Arizona of his
move or register in Colorado as required by law. In June 2006 he moved to
Oklahoma City and failed to notify Colorado of his change of address or
register in Oklahoma. In April 2007, when the Oklahoma City police
department eventually discovered that he was living in the state without
* The author wishes to express her sincere gratitude to Professor Liesa Richter and
Assistant United States Attorney Robert D. Gifford for their invaluable assistance with this
comment.
1. This story is a fictional account based loosely on the facts and applicable law in United
States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Lang, No. CR-070080-HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56655 (W.D. Okla. July 13, 2007).
2. See Act of Mar. 4, 1994, ch. 174, 1993 S.D. Spec. Sess. Laws 209 (codified as amended
at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1 to -32 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). For a list of state sex offender
registration laws in place at the time South Dakota enacted its registration law, see Abril R.
Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 n.2
(1995).

273

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

274

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:273

registering, he was taken into custody where he admitted that he knew he was
required to comply with the registration requirements of any state in which he
lived.
This hypothetical sex offender would likely be charged with a violation of
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), a federal
statute enacted July 27, 2006.3 SORNA makes it a crime for convicted sex
offenders to move from one state to another without updating their
registrations within three days of relocating to the new state.4 SORNA is also
retroactive—in an Interim Rule issued on February 28, 2007, the Attorney
General clarified that SORNA applies to sex offenders convicted of the
underlying sex offense before SORNA’s enactment.5 Based on SORNA’s
language, this defendant would argue that SORNA applies only to sex
offenders who travel after the law’s enactment.6 Because the defendant
traveled to Oklahoma in June 2006, a month before SORNA’s enactment, he
would argue that SORNA does not apply to him.7 The defendant would likely
also argue that SORNA did not require him to register until the Attorney
General issued the Interim Rule in February 2007; in other words, he would
argue that the Attorney General created his obligation to register in February
2007.8 Finally, he would argue that retroactive application of SORNA to his
pre-Act travel violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution
because it punishes him for acts committed before the law was enacted.9

3. 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2006).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c).
5. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
8894, 8897 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009)). A key point of
contention is whether the Interim Rule merely clarified SORNA’s registration requirements for
prior sex offenders—meaning that they had an obligation to register beginning on July 27,
2006—or whether it created the obligation to register on February 28, 2007. Compare United
States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 934 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that “Congress did not intend
to exempt all sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006, from SORNA’s requirements”), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009), with United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 858 (11th Cir.
2008) (finding that “Congress vested the Attorney General with sole discretion to determine
SORNA’s retroactivity”); see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (authorizing punishment of a state sex offender who
travels in interstate commerce and fails to update his registration within three days of
relocating).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub
nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301); see also
discussion infra Part IV.B.
8. See, e.g., Madera, 528 F.3d at 856-57; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 936; see also discussion infra
Part V.D-E.
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Although this is a hypothetical defendant, his story is anything but fictional.
Since SORNA’s enactment in July 2006, more than one hundred defendants
have challenged their convictions under the statute.10 Like the hypothetical
offender, these defendants knew that they had a duty to register before
SORNA was enacted because registration requirements existed in every state
by 1996.11 Moreover, all of these defendants remained unregistered after
SORNA was enacted. Nevertheless, these defendants have challenged their
convictions on many grounds, including statutory inapplicability, the Tenth
Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Commerce Clause, the
nondelegation doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process.12
Of these challenges, the statutory inapplicability and ex post facto claims
have been the most common and have generated the most controversy among
courts. Consequently, this comment focuses exclusively on the arguments
surrounding statutory inapplicability and ex post facto claims, highlighting the
particular issues that have divided district and circuit courts nationwide.
Because the date of travel plays a fundamental role in defendants’
arguments, this comment divides the defendants into two groups based on
when their interstate travel occurred. The first group consists of defendants
who moved to a new state before SORNA’s enactment on July 27, 2006.13
These defendants are referred to as “pre-Act travelers” because their travel
occurred before the law’s enactment. The second group of defendants are
those who traveled to a new state between July 27, 2006, and February 28,
2007, the date of the Attorney General’s Interim Rule.14 These defendants are
referred to as “gap travelers” because their travel occurred after SORNA’s
enactment but before the Interim Rule was issued.
Part II of this comment explores the history of sex offender registration
laws at the state and federal level. Part III discusses SORNA’s registration
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2009); Dixon, 551 F.3d 578;
United States v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157JVP-CN, 2008 WL 474244 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2008); United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d
846 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
11. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003) (“By 1996, every State, the District of
Columbia, and the Federal Government had enacted some variation of Megan’s Law.”).
12. See, e.g., Dixon, 551 F.3d at 582 (statutory inapplicability); United States v. Gagnon,
574 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179 (D. Me. 2008) (Tenth Amendment); United States v. Mason, 510 F.
Supp. 2d 923 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (Ex Post Facto Clause, Commerce Clause, nondelegation
doctrine, and procedural and substantive due process).
13. See, e.g., Dixon, 551 F.3d at 582; Pitts, 2008 WL 474244, at *2; Smith, 481 F. Supp.
2d at 847.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560, 562 (S.D.W. Va. 2007); United
States v. Kapp, 487 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538 (M.D. Pa. 2007); United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp.
2d 747, 749 (W.D. Va. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222.
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and punishment provisions that have formed the basis for sex offender
convictions. Part IV explores statutory applicability challenges based on
SORNA’s language when the statute is applied to pre-Act and gap travel,
while Part V addresses ex post facto challenges to retroactive application of
SORNA. Finally, Part VI argues that SORNA applies to all defendants,
regardless of their dates of travel, so long as their failures to register extended
past the date of SORNA’s enactment. Part VI also asserts that although
SORNA is subject to ex post facto review, its application to pre-Act travel and
failure to register does not violate the Constitution because the statute is not
“retrospective” when applied to defendants who failed to register before
SORNA’s passage and remained unregistered after its passage.
II. History of Sex Offender Registration Laws
A. State Registration Laws
The presence of a criminal registration system in the United States dates
back to the 1930s, when several municipalities required felons to register to
assist police in monitoring offenders in their jurisdictions.15 In 1957, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down these municipal registration laws on the grounds
that such laws violated the felons’ due process rights.16 The principle
underlying the Court’s holding was that “reasonable persons were not likely
to recognize the need to inquire into the existence of the local law.”17
Despite this ruling, states have gradually reintroduced registration laws,
only this time with a narrower focus on convicted sex offenders.18 California
was the first state to implement a sex offender registry in 1947.19 By 1986,
five states had passed sex offender registration laws,20 and by 1993, almost
half of the states had followed suit.21 The initial sex offender registration laws
were relatively narrow in scope; most were enacted primarily to assist law
enforcement in the investigation of new sex crimes by helping officers locate

15. Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 279 (2005).
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957)).
18. Id.
19. Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process
and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172
n.25 (1999).
20. Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of SexOffender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 164
(2003).
21. Id.
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possible suspects.22 Given the limited purpose of the laws, the general public
did not have access to the registry information.23 In the early 1990s, however,
a series of highly publicized attacks on children resulted in the expansion of
state sex offender laws to include a community protection function.24
Washington became the first state to experiment with a community
notification requirement following the abduction, rape, and murder of several
boys in 1989 and 1990.25 Outraged Washington citizens pressured the state
legislature for a law that would require the state to release information about
the presence of sex offenders to the general public.26 The advocates
succeeded, and Washington passed the first community notification law in
1990.27 Louisiana followed suit in 1992.28
But perhaps no case garnered greater national support for community
notification laws than the brutal rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan
Kanka in New Jersey. When Megan was murdered by a convicted sex
offender living across the street, her mother, along with many other New
Jersey citizens, argued that Megan’s death could have been prevented if New
Jersey had maintained a community notification system through which Ms.
Kanka could have learned that a sex offender lived nearby.29 Their lobbying
was successful: on October 31, 1994, the New Jersey legislature passed the
first “Megan’s Law,” requiring the state to release information about
convicted sex offenders to the public.30
New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, unlike prior community notification statutes,
created a three-tier system in which the degree of community notification was
determined by the risk of reoffense.31 The offender’s risk of reoffense could
22. Id. at 164-65.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 165.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id.; see also Community Protection Act, ch. 3, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (relevant
provisions codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West 2005 & Supp.
2010)). Washington’s procedure for disseminating sex offender information varied by county
and included measures such as posting the information on police bulletin boards and
distributing fliers door-to-door. See Garfinkle, supra note 20, at 165.
28. See Act of June 18, 1992, No. 388, 1992 La. Acts 1177 (relevant provisions codified
as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542 (2005 & Supp. 2010)).
29. Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam
Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 697, 700. Megan’s attacker,
Jesse Timmendequas, shared a house with two roommates who were also convicted sex
offenders. Id. at 700 & n.29.
30. See Garfinkle, supra note 20, at 166.
31. See Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 128, 1994 N.J. Laws 1132, 1133-34 (relevant provisions
codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(a), (c) (West 2005)).
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be ranked as low, moderate, or high.32 The statute assigned the task of
classifying the risk of reoffense for a particular offender to the county
prosecutor of the county in which the sex offender resided.33 The statute also
specified that prosecutors should take into account factors such as whether the
offense was committed against a child, whether the offense involved a weapon
or serious bodily injury, whether the offender had psychological problems that
indicated a possibility of recidivism, and the offender’s response to
treatment.34
If a low-risk offender moved into the community, only local authorities
received notification.35 Local schools and community groups that dealt with
children received information about moderate-risk offenders.36 Finally, the
entire community received notification of the presence of high-risk
offenders.37 Shortly after passage of the law, a spokeswoman for the Attorney
General of New Jersey noted that the variety of notification methods ranged
from fliers distributed door-to-door to letters mailed out to the community.38
B. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offenders Registration Act
Shortly before New Jersey enacted the first Megan’s Law, Congress
considered a bill providing that every state must maintain a sex offender
registry.39 Enacted in September 1994, this bill became known as the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Act (Wetterling Act).40 The Wetterling Act created strong
incentives for each state to adopt sex offender registration laws and maintain
its own sex offender registry in accordance with guidelines promulgated by
the U.S. Attorney General.41 Though technically not mandatory, the Act
effectively ensured registration systems nationwide by conditioning federal
funding for state law enforcement on states’ compliance with the law.42 The
Wetterling Act also “provided a recommended national baseline for [state] sex
32. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c).
33. See id. § 2C:7-8(d).
34. See id. § 2C:7-8(b).
35. See id. § 2C:7-8(c)(1).
36. See id. § 2C:7-8(c)(2).
37. See id. § 2C:7-8(c)(3).
38. See Gwen Florio, The Legal Challenges of Megan’s Law: Three Cases Went to Court.
One Issue: Notifying Sex Offenders’ Neighbors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 29, 1995, at C1.
39. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1994).
40. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
14071-14072 (2006)).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)-(b).
42. See id. § 14071(g)(2)(A).
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offender registration programs,”43 requiring states to include certain elements,
such as procedures for law enforcement to notify sex offenders of their duty
to register,44 requirements that offenders regularly verify and update their
information,45 and criminal penalty provisions for failing to register.46
Initially, the Wetterling Act gave states the option of including a community
notification provision but did not mandate such a provision.47 After several
states followed New Jersey’s lead by enacting Megan’s Laws, Congress
amended the Wetterling Act to require that all states maintain a mechanism for
notifying the public about sex offenders in their vicinity.48 The amendment
left states with considerable discretion to determine precisely how they would
release the information.49
The Wetterling Act was amended again in 1996 to include the Pam Lyncher
Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act.50 This addition to the
Wetterling Act created a federal database at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to track the whereabouts of sex offenders.51 Subsequently,
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Congress amended the Wetterling Act
several more times to both reflect and promote “trends in the development of
the state registration and notification programs.”52
43. LAURA L. ROGERS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SMART OFFICE: OPEN FOR BUSINESS 1
(2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/register.pdf.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A).
45. See id. § 14071(b)(3)-(5).
46. See id. § 14071(d). While the Wetterling Act initially vested the states with sole
authority to establish criminal penalties for failure to register, it was subsequently amended to
provide for no more than one year imprisonment for first-time offenders and no more than ten
years imprisonment for repeat offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i) (2006) (originally enacted
in Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 , Pub. L. No. 104-236,
110 Stat. 3093).
47. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101(d)(3), 108 Stat. 2038, 2041-42 (1994) (providing
that law enforcement agencies “may release relevant information [about a registrant] that is
necessary to protect the public” (emphasis added)).
48. See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (providing that
law enforcement agencies “shall release relevant information [about a registrant] that is
necessary to protect the public” (emphasis added)) (current version at 42 U.S.C § 14071(e)); see
also Garfinkle, supra note 20, at 167.
49. See Garfinkle, supra note 20, at 167. Under a 2003 amendment, however, states must
maintain a publicly accessible Internet site as one of the methods of community notification.
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 604, 117 Stat. 650, 688 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14072(e)(2)).
50. 110 Stat. 3093 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 14072).
51. See id. at sec. 2, § 170102(b), 110 Stat. at 3093-94.
52. See National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg.
30210, 30211 (proposed May 30, 2007) (describing the “piecemeal amendments” to the
Wetterling Act).
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C. The Need for Uniformity
The Wetterling Act was successful in one key respect: by 1996, every state
and the District of Columbia had implemented a sex offender registration
system.53 Still, the inconsistencies among the state registration laws created
problems. Because the Wetterling Act established only a baseline
recommendation for sex offender registration requirements, the states
maintained significant discretion in deciding which crimes triggered
registration, appropriate tracking methods, and punishment provisions.54 As
a result, the sex offender registration laws varied significantly from state-tostate.55
One of the chief effects of state discretion was that many sex offenders
were able to evade the system by moving from one state to another.56 In
February 2007 the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
reported in a press release that, of the 603,000 sex offenders required to
register in the United States, over 100,000 had disappeared from the system
altogether.57 The press release cited the discrepancies in state registration
laws as one of the primary reasons for noncompliance, noting that under thenexisting law, sex offenders were free “to “manipulate the system and relocate
to more lenient states.”58 Thus, while the Wetterling Act was largely
successful in obtaining state compliance, the problem of individual
53. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).
54. See Lara Geer Farley, Note, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the TwentyFirst Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 476 (2008).
55. See id. at 476-80.
56. Id. at 477.
57. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, National Center for Missing
& Exploited Children Creates New Unit to Help Find 100,000 Missing Sex Offenders and Calls
for States To Do Their Part, at para. 1 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.missingkids.
com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?Language Country=en_ US&PageId=3081.
58. Id. at para 2. One commentator summarized the main differences in the laws as follows:
(1) [T]wenty-five states treat noncompliance with one or more registration duties
as only a misdemeanor; (2) four states place the responsibility to notify the state
solely on the offender when moving to another state; (3) eight states have
ambiguous laws as to whether the state or the sex offender must notify the new
state when the offender moves to another state; and (4) only seven states revoke
mandatory parole and require the sex offender to return to prison when the
offender fails to register.
Farley, supra note 54, at 477 (citations omitted). In addition to discrepancies among the
registration laws, the community notification provisions also varied from state-to-state. Id. at
477-78. While some states had begun to create websites to disseminate the information, other
states were still using more antiquated methods such as posting billboards or signs in front of
sex offenders’ homes. See id. at 478.
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noncompliance rose to the forefront because of the large amount of state
discretion in drafting the laws. Ultimately, Congress concluded that a new
federal law was necessary to combat the growing problem of noncompliance
among sex offenders.
D. The Adam Walsh Act
In the early 2000s, Congressman Mark Foley, among others, drafted a new
piece of legislation aimed at improving the existing sex offender registration
laws by deterring noncompliance among sex offenders and increasing public
protection.59 In the congressional hearings regarding the bill, Senators Reid
and Biden discussed the discrepancies in state sex offender laws across the
country and the effect of such discrepancies on individual noncompliance.60
Senator Biden noted that interstate travel was a major problem with the old
registration system because many states had less sophisticated means of
tracking sex offenders than others.61 He added that the bill authorized grants
to local law enforcement agencies and provided software and other tools to
ensure that each community had adequate means to enforce the law’s
requirements.62 Most important, the bill established uniform rules that each
sex offender must abide by, including mandatory registration immediately
upon release from prison, periodic in-person check-ins with local authorities,
photograph updates to enable parents to identify offenders living nearby, and
finally, to deter noncompliance, increased penalties for failure to register.63
On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed the bill into law as the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act).64 Title I
59. See H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 3, 6-8 (2008).
60. 152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8013-14, S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sens.
Biden and Reid, respectively).
61. Id. at S8014 (statement of Sen. Biden).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587. The Act was named after six-year-old Adam
Walsh, who was abducted from a department store on July 27, 1981. Nat’l Ctr. for Missing &
Exploited Children, The Adam Walsh Story, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/
PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=1156 (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). Adam
disappeared while accompanying his mother on a shopping outing. Id. He had joined a group
of children playing video games in one section of the department store while his mother briefly
looked for a lamp in another section. Id. Ten minutes later, his mother could not find him. Id.
His remains were discovered sixteen days later, but his killer eluded authorities. Id. After
Adam’s abduction, his family was instrumental in founding the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children. See Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Timeline, http://www.
missingkids.com/en_US/timeline/flash.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2010); see also 152 CONG. REC.
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of the Act contains the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA).65 According to the Attorney General, the purpose of SORNA was
to “strengthen and increase the effectiveness of sex offender registration and
notification for the protection of the public, and to eliminate potential gaps
and loopholes under the pre-existing standards by means of which sex
offenders could attempt to evade registration requirements or the
consequences of registration violations.”66
In its effort to combat noncompliance among sex offenders, SORNA makes
the following key changes to the Wetterling Act: (1) an expansion of the
number of jurisdictions required to maintain a registry, which now includes
tribal jurisdictions; (2) coverage of additional offenses such as child
pornography crimes, more sexual assault crimes, and inchoate offenses; (3) a
lengthening of the registration period, which now ranges from fifteen years to
life, based on a three-tier scheme that classifies offenders according to risk
level; (4) a requirement of in-person appearances for registration updates; (5)
a requirement of more information on registration forms, including social
security numbers, employment and school information, details of the
registration offense, current photographs, and fingerprints; and (6) the
establishment of a new federal crime for failing to register, punishable by a
maximum of ten years imprisonment.67
III. SORNA Registration and Penalty Provisions
A. Registration Requirements
Title 42, § 16913(a)–(d) of the U.S. Code sets forth SORNA’s registration
requirements.68 Subsection (a) describes where sex offenders are required to
register.69 According to the statute, an offender is required to register “in each
S8030 (statement of Sen. Frist). His family was also heavily involved in several pieces of childprotection legislation throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and his father, John Walsh, assisted in
drafting the Adam Walsh Act. See id. Interestingly, the Adam Walsh case was closed in
December 2008. Yolanne Almanzar, 27 Years Later, Case is Closed in Slaying of Abducted
Child, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A18. Convicted serial killer Ottis Toole once confessed
to the murder but later recanted prior to his death in prison in 1996. Id. The police department
in Hollywood, Florida, declared the case closed after considering the “accumulation of all the
circumstantial evidence over the years.” Id.
65. Adam Walsh Act §§ 101-131, 120 Stat. at 590-601 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1690116902, 16911-16929 (2006)).
66. Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894,
8895 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007).
67. ROGERS, supra note 43, at 2-4.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)-(d).
69. Id. § 16913(a).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/3

2010]

COMMENT

283

jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee,
and where the offender is a student.”70
Subsection (b), captioned “Initial registration,” establishes when sex
offenders must register for the first time.71 This subsection divides sex
offenders into two groups: (1) those who are sentenced to imprisonment and
(2) those who are not sentenced to imprisonment.72 Sex offenders who are
sentenced to imprisonment are required to register before completing their
terms of imprisonment.73 Sex offenders who are not sentenced to
imprisonment must register within three days of receiving their sentences.74
Subsection (c), captioned “Keeping the registration current,” mandates that
sex offenders update their registration to reflect their current status and
location.75 Under this subsection, sex offenders are required to update their
registration information within three days of changing name, residence,
employment, or student status.76 The subsection further requires that the sex
offender appear in person in at least one of the jurisdictions listed in
subsection (a).77 That jurisdiction is then required to provide the updated
information to all jurisdictions in which the sex offender is required to
register.78 For example, if sex offender S resides in State A and works in State
B, S may choose to appear in person in only State A to change his
information.79 State A is then required to notify State B of S’s updated
information.80
Of all the registration provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 16913, subsection (d) has
sparked the most debate about its intended meaning. Both prosecutors and
defendants agree that subsection (d) delegates authority to the Attorney
General to make some clarifications with respect to SORNA’s application;
however, disagreement remains as to precisely what the Attorney General is
authorized to do. Subsection (d), captioned “Initial registration of sex
offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section,” reads as
follows:
70. Id.
71. Id. § 16913(b).
72. See id.
73. Id. § 16913(b)(1).
74. Id. § 16913(b)(2).
75. Id. § 16913(c).
76. Id.
77. Id. Recall that the jurisdictions listed in subsection (a) include the jurisdictions where
the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.
Id. § 16913(a); see also supra text accompanying note 70.
78. Id. § 16913(c).
79. See id.
80. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

284

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:273

The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this title to sex offenders
convicted before [the enactment of this Act] or its implementation
in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the
registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of
sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this
section.81
There are essentially two interpretations of subsection (d).82 The first
interpretation is that subsection (d) contemplates one group of sex offenders
who share two characteristics: (1) a pre-SORNA conviction and (2) the
inability to comply with subsection (b).83 Under this interpretation, the phrase
“unable to comply with subsection (b)” means that the individual could not
initially register because his state did not require him to register at the time he
either was released from prison or received his sentence.84 According to this
interpretation, subsection (d) limits the Attorney General’s authority to
specifying SORNA’s retroactivity for individuals who were both previously
convicted of a sex offense and initially unable to register.85
The second interpretation of subsection (d) is that it contemplates two
different groups of sex offenders.86 The first group consists of sex offenders
who were convicted before SORNA’s enactment, and the second group
consists of sex offenders who were initially unable to comply with subsection
(b).87 Under this interpretation, the first clause of subsection (d) gives the
Attorney General the authority to specify SORNA’s applicability to previously
convicted sex offenders, while the second clause vests the Attorney General
with the authority to prescribe registration requirements for both
groups—previously convicted sex offenders and those initially unable to
register.88
81. Id. § 16913(d).
82. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 934 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Congress was
likely concerned with old convictions—offenders who had already served their sentences and
never before had been required to register.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009); see also id.
at 944 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Prior to SORNA, some states did not have sex offender
registration requirements as broad as SORNA’s; others had no registries at all. As a result,
some individuals who are classified as sex offenders under SORNA were not previously
required or able to register under state law.”).
85. See id. at 934-35 (majority opinion).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2009).
88. See id. at 226-27.
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B. Attorney General’s Interim Rule
Pursuant to subsection (d), on February 28, 2007, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales issued an Interim Rule that stated, “SORNA applies to all sex
offenders . . . regardless of when they were convicted.”89 The significance of
the Interim Rule depends on the interpretation of subsection (d). For the
government, which argues that subsection (d) contemplates a previously
convicted sex offender whose jurisdiction did not require him to register at the
time of sentencing or release from prison, the Rule’s significance is limited to
the narrow group of previously convicted sex offenders who were unable to
initially register under subsection (b).90 Conversely, for defendants, who
argue that subsection (d) contemplates two different groups of defendants, the
Interim Rule applies to a previously convicted sex offender who was able to
initially register under subsection (b).91
C. Penalty Provision of SORNA
Title 18, § 2250 of the U.S. Code contains SORNA’s penalty provision.92
This provision defines violations of SORNA and sets the maximum penalty
for violations at no more than ten years imprisonment.93
Because SORNA is a federal statute, the government needs federal
jurisdiction to charge an offender under the statute. Thus, there are two basic
ways that an individual can violate SORNA.94 The first applies to individuals
who commit federal sex offenses, while the second applies to individuals who
commit state sex offenses.95 Logically, it is easy for the government to obtain
federal jurisdiction over the federal sex offenders—the existence of a previous
federal sex offense conviction constitutes the jurisdictional link.96 Under §
2250(a), federal sex offenders must satisfy three elements in order to be in
violation of SORNA.97 First, they must be “required to register under the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act,” as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
89. Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894,
8896 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007).
90. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 16-17, United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926
(10th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-7107), 2008 WL 2513959, at *16-17 (quoting United States v. Zuniga,
No. 4:07CR3156, 2008 WL 2184118, at *10-12 (D. Neb. May 23, 2008)).
91. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 13-14, Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926 (No. 07-7107),
2007 WL 5110327, at *13-14.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).
93. See id.
94. See id. § 2250(a)(2).
95. Id.
96. See id. § 2250(a)(2)(A).
97. See id. § 2250(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3).
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16911.98 Second, they must have a federal sex offense conviction, such as a
conviction that occurred on tribal land or under a federal statute (e.g., the
statute prohibiting interstate transport of a minor for prostitution).99 Finally,
the sex offender must “knowingly fail[] to register or update a registration as
required by” SORNA.100
By contrast, for the government to obtain jurisdiction over state sex
offenders, there must be a different federal anchor—in this case, interstate
travel. Thus, for a state sex offender to violate SORNA, three slightly
different elements must be established.101 First, the individual must be
required to register under SORNA.102 Second, the sex offender must “travel[]
in interstate or foreign commerce, or enter[] or leave[], or reside[] in, Indian
country.”103 Third, the sex offender must knowingly fail to register or update
a registration as required under SORNA.104 State sex offenders who travel in
interstate commerce make up the vast majority of defendants who challenge
the applicability of SORNA to their failures to register. As discussed in the
next section, these challenges typically revolve around the dates of their travel
and the meaning of the word “travels” in the language of the statute.
IV. Summary of the Challenges and a Closer Look at SORNA’s
Applicability to Pre-Act and Gap Travel
A. An Overview of the Challenges
The cases challenging SORNA have primarily featured objections to the
statute as applied to particular defendants. Most of the defendants adopt a
two-part argument: First, they argue that SORNA does not apply to them.
Second, they argue that if SORNA does apply to them, it violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
Defendants raise two distinct textual arguments to support the statutory
inapplicability claim. Which of the two arguments a particular defendant
advances depends on his status as either a pre-Act or gap traveler. Pre-Act
travelers focus on the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and argue that Congress’s use
of the phrase “travels in interstate . . . commerce” illustrates an intent to reach
only travel that occurs after SORNA’s enactment.105 In other words, pre-Act
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. § 2250(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 2250(a)(3).
See id. § 2250(a)(1), (2)(B), (3).
Id. § 2250(a)(1).
Id. § 2250(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 2250(a)(3).
See id. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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travelers argue that if Congress had intended to include past travelers within
the statute, it would have used both past and present tense. By contrast, gap
travelers argue that SORNA is inapplicable to them based on the text of 42
U.S.C. § 16913(d), which delegates to the Attorney General the authority to
specify the applicability of SORNA to previous offenders.106 These
defendants argue that subsection (d) gives the Attorney General the exclusive
authority to declare whether past sex offenders must register and that, as a
result, the obligation to register was created by the Interim Rule on February
28, 2007.107
After arguing that SORNA is inapplicable by its own terms, both pre-Act
and gap travelers argue that the retroactive application of SORNA violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Defendants argue that SORNA is a punitive statute,
and therefore subject to ex post facto review, by distinguishing it from the
Alaska sex offender registration statute at issue in Smith v. Doe.108 Defendants
then argue that SORNA’s retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause because all of the elements necessary to support a conviction—a
previous sex offense, interstate travel, and failure to register—occurred before
SORNA’s enactment or before SORNA was made applicable through the
Interim Rule.
The remainder of Part IV details the two principal arguments for SORNA’s
statutory inapplicability. Part V then addresses the ex post facto challenges
to SORNA’s retroactive application.
B. Meaning of the Word “Travels”
Pre-Act travelers frequently argue that SORNA applies only to individuals
who travel after the date of enactment.109 This argument is based on a literal
interpretation of the language used in 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Specifically, the
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006).
107. This argument is technically available to both pre-Act and gap travelers, as both groups
of defendants could argue that they did not have an obligation to register until the Interim Rule
was issued. Nonetheless, this argument has been raised almost exclusively by gap travelers.
See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Carr v. United States, No. 08-1301 (filed Apr. 22,
2009), 2009 WL 1101586 (pre-Act traveler did not challenge SORNA’s applicability based on
subsection (d)).
108. 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding that the Alaska statute requiring previously
convicted sex offenders to register did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the statute
was nonpunitive).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub
nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301); United States
v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157-JVP-CN,
2008 WL 474244, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2008); United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846,
849-50 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
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provision states that one is subject to a penalty if he “is required to register
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; . . . travels in
interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian
country; and knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.”110 Many defendants
point to the use of the word “travels” and argue that it is forward-looking
language suggesting that SORNA was intended to apply only to future
travelers.
The first district courts to address this issue sided largely with the
defendants and concluded that pre-Act travel does not fall within the reach of
the statute.111 For example, in United States v. Smith, the Eastern District of
Michigan considered the case of a defendant who moved from New York to
Michigan in August 2004, two years before SORNA was enacted.112 The
defendant argued that the plain meaning of the word “travels” indicates a
“forward-looking intent that the law would apply to one who travels in
interstate commerce after July 27, 2006.”113 He further argued that because
the plain meaning of the word is clear, the court need not go beyond the
statute to assist in its interpretation.114
The court noted that the question of statutory construction begins with a
plain reading of the statute, and that legislative history and policy
considerations are irrelevant if the words themselves are clear.115 The court
also stated that “Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing
statutes”116 and that “a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication.”117
The court ultimately concluded that because Congress provided no indication
that SORNA was meant to apply retroactively, the word “travels” should be
interpreted to mean future travel.118 The court acknowledged that even if there
were competing interpretations, the rule of lenity required the court to select
the “less harsh interpretation.”119 The court therefore held that the defendant
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Deese, No. CR-07-167-L, 2007 WL 2778362, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. Sallee, No. CR-07-152-L, 2007 WL 3283739, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 13, 2007); United States v. Heriot, Cr. No. 3:07-323, 2007 WL 2199516, at
*2 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007); Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51.
112. See 481 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
113. Id. at 850.
114. Id. at 848.
115. See id. at 850.
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)).
117. Id. (quoting Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006)).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 851 n.1.
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did not violate SORNA because the statute did not apply to him at the time he
traveled.120
Conversely, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana held that the use of the word “travels” does not prevent
prosecutions against pre-Act travelers for failure to register.121 In United
States v. Pitts, the court concluded that interstate travel is a jurisdictional
element of the crime described in § 2250, rendering the date of travel
irrelevant to the court’s analysis.122 The court noted that the statute “does not
criminalize interstate travel”; rather, it criminalizes the failure to register.123
Thus, because the defendant failed to register after SORNA’s enactment, the
statute was applicable to him.124
The Pitts court further observed that limiting SORNA’s applicability to
future travelers would undermine the statute’s purpose.125 The court
recognized that SORNA’s stated purpose was to “establish a comprehensive
national registration system”126 and commented that “[l]imiting the reach of
the statute only to those who travel in interstate commerce after enactment of
the statute would be clearly contrary to the intent of the Congress to create a
comprehensive national database of sex offenders and offenders against
children for the protection of the public.”127
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to
confront the meaning of the word “travels” in United States v. Husted.128 The
Tenth Circuit held that the use of the word “travels” indicates forward-looking
intent and that SORNA therefore cannot be applied to pre-Act travel.129 The
court agreed with the analysis in United States v. Smith that the statutory
language is unambiguous and that Congress’s choice in adopting a verb tense
is highly relevant.130 Additionally, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of a purportedly analogous statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423, which
120. Id. at 854.
121. See United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157-JVP-CN, 2008 WL 474244, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb.
14, 2008); see also United States v. Dixon, No. 3:07-CR-72(01) RM, 2007 WL 4553720, at *3
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2007) (finding that the defendant’s date of travel is not relevant to the
SORNA analysis), rev’d, 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301).
122. See Pitts, 2008 WL 474244, at *3.
123. See id.
124. See id. at *4.
125. See id. at *3.
126. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)).
127. Id.
128. 545 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2008).
129. See id. at 1243.
130. See id. at 1243-44.
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punishes “any U.S. citizen ‘who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in
any illicit sexual conduct with another person.’”131 In United States v.
Jackson, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the language of the foreign sexual conduct
statute and determined that the present tense of the verb “travels”
demonstrates Congress’s intent to reach only future foreign travel.132 The
Tenth Circuit found the Jackson reasoning persuasive in determining that
Congress meant for SORNA to apply to future travelers.133
It took less than two months for the circuit courts to split on the meaning
of “travels.”134 In United States v. Dixon, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a conviction based on pre-Act travel, finding that the Tenth
Circuit’s interpretation of the word “travels” yields illogical results.135 The
court noted that the statute also refers to one who “resides in[] Indian country”
and commented that the present tense of the word “resides” clearly indicates
a status and not an action.136 The court reached this conclusion by observing
that the statute applies to a convicted sex offender who “enters or leaves”
Indian country, as well as one who “resides in” Indian country, meaning that
both “old residents . . ., as well as new entrants, are covered.”137 The court
seemed to imply that because Congress covered the full spectrum of travel
dates by including past and future residents, it must have meant for “resides”
to be a status requirement rather than a temporal requirement.138 Thus, the
court reasoned, interpreting “resides” as a status requirement and “travels” as
a temporal requirement would mean that “a sex offender who has resided in
Indian country since long before the Act was passed is subject to the Act but
not someone who crossed state lines before the Act was passed.”139 The court
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a temporal requirement, but
rather a “constitutional predicate” for application of the statute, similar to the
movement-in-commerce requirement of the felon-in-possession law.140
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits are not the only circuits that have split over
the meaning of the word “travels.” As of September 2009, the Eighth Circuit
has joined the Tenth Circuit in holding that SORNA is not applicable to pre131. Id. at 1244 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006)).
132. 480 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007).
133. See Husted, 545 F.3d at 1244.
134. Compare id., with United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing
to exempt pre-Act travelers from the law’s reach), cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United States,
130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301).
135. See 551 F.3d at 583.
136. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (2006)).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Act travelers,141 while the Eleventh Circuit has sided with the Seventh Circuit
and found that the word “travels” does not preclude prosecutions under
SORNA for pre-Act travel.142 On September 30, 2009, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the circuits.143
C. Significance of the Interim Rule
Because gap travelers, by definition, traveled after SORNA’s enactment,
the meaning of the word “travels” is of little consequence to them. Instead,
they have focused on the significance of the Interim Rule,144 arguing that
SORNA did not apply to them until the Attorney General issued the Rule in
February 2007 declaring that the law was to be applied retroactively. Gap
travelers argue that because Congress did not expressly state that the law was
to have retroactive effect, but instead chose to delegate that authority to the
Attorney General, the registration requirement could not have applied to them
at the time they traveled in interstate commerce.145
Resolution of this issue requires an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
16913(d).146 Subsection (d), which delegates authority to the Attorney
General to specify SORNA’s applicability, has generated considerable debate
among courts. The debate essentially boils down to one question: when did
141. See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he only
punishment that can arise under SORNA comes from a violation of § 2250, which punishes
convicted sex offenders who travel in interstate commerce after the enactment of SORNA”
(emphasis added)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009).
142. See United States v. Dumont, 555 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
66 (2009).
143. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301) (granting
a petition for writ of certiorari from the Seventh Circuit’s decision). The Seventh Circuit
consolidated the appeals from United States v. Dixon, No. 3:07-CR-72(01) RM, 2007 WL
4553720 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2007), and United States v. Carr, No. 1:07-CR-73, 2007 WL
3256600 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2007), as they involved overlapping issues. For reasons unrelated
to the meaning of the word “travels,” Dixon’s conviction was reversed, while Carr’s conviction
was affirmed. See Dixon, 551 F.3d at 586-87. As a result, only Carr has appealed the Seventh
Circuit decision to the Supreme Court.
144. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
8894 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007) .
145. See, e.g., United States v. Kapp, 487 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
146. Subsection (d), captioned “Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with
subsection (b) of this section,” is reproduced here for the reader’s convenience:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before [the enactment
of this Act] or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules
for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex
offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006).
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the obligation to register begin for pre-enactment sex offenders? In other
words, did the obligation to register arise upon SORNA’s enactment, or was
it created when the Attorney General exercised his authority to issue the
Interim Rule?
To answer this question, one must first determine whether subsection (d)
contemplates one or two groups of offenders. Defendants argue that
subsection (d) contemplates two groups of offenders.147 This is because the
vast majority of defendants who challenge their SORNA convictions were
able to comply with subsection (b) because their jurisdictions required them
to register at the time they were sentenced for their original sex offenses.148
Thus, in order for these defendants to argue successfully that their duty to
register hinged on the Attorney General’s Rule, they must prove that
subsection (d) actually imagines two different groups of sex offenders—those
who were unable to comply with subsection (b), and those who were
convicted before the enactment of SORNA.149 If a defendant can show that
the Rule applies to both classes of offenders, he can prove that he justifiably
relied on the Rule to establish his duty to register.150
The counterargument to this line of reasoning is that subsection (d)
contemplates only one group of sex offenders who share two characteristics:
(1) a pre-Act conviction and (2) impossibility of initial registration.151
Prosecutors argue for this interpretation because it prevents defendants who
were able to register initially from arguing that they relied on the Interim Rule
to create their duty to register.152 Under this interpretation, if a defendant was
convicted of a sex offense before passage of SORNA but was nonetheless
required to register in his state under preexisting sex offender registration
laws, subsection (d) does not apply to him and the law has been retroactive
since the day it was enacted.153
The problem of interpreting subsection (d) has resulted in a significant split
among district courts.154 For example, in United States v. Kapp, a federal
147. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant/Appellant, supra note 91, at 13-14.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 935 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
149. See id. at 934-35.
150. See id. at 934-35 & n.7.
151. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee, supra note 90, at 16.
152. See id. at 16-17.
153. See Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 935.
154. Following is a nonexhaustive list of district courts that have found that subsection (d)
contemplates two groups of offenders: United States v. Cole, No. 07-cr-30062-DRH, 2007 WL
2714111, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2007); United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560, 568-69
(S.D.W. Va. 2007); United States v. Heriot, Cr. No. 3:07-323, 2007 WL 2199516, at *2 (D.S.C.
July 27, 2007); United States v. Muzio, No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 WL 2159462, at *5 (E.D.
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district court in Pennsylvania agreed with the defendant in concluding that the
two-clause structure of subsection (d) suggests that the statute contemplates
two groups of offenders.155 The court determined that the first clause
authorizes the Attorney General to determine how SORNA applies to past
offenders.156 The second clause, according to the court, authorizes the
Attorney General “to promulgate regulations ‘for the registration of any such
[previously convicted] sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders
unable to comply with subsection (b).’”157 Under this interpretation, the first
clause gives the Attorney General authority to declare whether past offenders
must register, while the second clause gives him authority to declare how the
past offenders must register.158 The court concluded that the first clause refers
only to past offenders.159 The second clause, however, contemplates both past
offenders and offenders initially unable to register.160
In United States v. Muzio, a federal district court in Missouri reached a
similar conclusion and held that SORNA’s registration requirements were not
applicable to pre-Act offenders until the February 2007 Interim Rule.161 In
Muzio, the prosecution urged the court to consider the heading of subsection
(d), “Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection
(b),”162 as support for the view that Congress intended for subsection (d) to
apply only to past offenders who were unable to initially register.163
Nevertheless, the district court refused to consider the heading of the
subsection because it did not find the statutory language—as opposed to the
Mo. July 26, 2007); United States v. Smith, 528 F. Supp. 2d 615, 619-20 (S.D.W. Va. 2007);
United States v. Kapp, 487 F. Supp. 2d 536, 542 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Following is a
nonexhaustive list of district courts that have found that subsection (d) contemplates only one
group of offenders: United States v. May, Nos. 4:07-cr-00164-JEG & 1:07-cr-00059-JEG, 2007
WL 2790388, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 24, 2007), aff’d, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009); United States v. Sawn, No. 6:07cr00020, 2007 WL 2344980,
at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2007), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222 (4th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzales, No. 5:07cr27-RS, 2007 WL 2298004, at *4 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 9, 2007); United States v. Roberts, No. 6:07-CR-70031, 2007 WL 2155750, at *2 (W.D.
Va., July 27, 2007); United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 928 (M.D. Fla. 2007); United
States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750-51 (W.D. Va. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Hatcher, 560
F.3d 222.
155. 487 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006)).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 WL 2159462, at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2007).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
163. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462, at *3-4.
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language of the subsection heading—to be ambiguous.164 Citing Minnesota
Transportation Regulation Board v. United States,165 the court concluded that
headings cannot be considered when the plain meaning of a statute is clear on
its face.166 The court ultimately agreed with Kapp and determined that the
sentence structure of subsection (d) supports the two-group interpretation;
accordingly, the court held that past offenders did not have a duty to register
until the Interim Rule was issued.167
The case of United States v. Beasley represents the opposing view.168
There, a federal district court in Georgia found the language of subsection (d)
ambiguous.169 The court determined that an isolated reading of subsection (d)
suggests two possible interpretations: the subsection contemplates either two
groups of offenders (past offenders and those unable to initially register), or
one group of offenders, such that past offenders “are included within (and not
a separate group from) the broader category of ‘sex offenders who are unable
to comply with subsection (b).’”170 Given the dual interpretations, the court
utilized the heading to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the view that
subsection (d) applies exclusively to offenders who were unable to register
under their states’ laws at the time of conviction.171 Additionally, the court
reasoned from the statute’s grammatical structure that
[b]y using the word “other” to modify the noun phrase “categories
of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (d)
[sic],” the statute implies that offenders convicted prior to the
law’s enactment are one of the categories of offenders unable to
comply with subsection (b). As noted above, this interpretation
would limit the Attorney General’s authority to providing
regulations instructing offenders unable to comply with subsection
(b) on how they should initially register.172
Moreover, the Beasley court acknowledged that a narrower interpretation
of subsection (d) is more consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting
SORNA.173 The court noted that it was Congress’s intent “to establish a
164. Id. at *3.
165. 966 F.2d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.,
331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)).
166. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462, at *3.
167. See id. at *4-5.
168. No. 1:07-CR-115-TCB, 2007 WL 3489999, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2007).
169. Id.
170. Id. at *6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006)).
171. See id.
172. Id. at *6 n.6.
173. See id. at *7.
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comprehensive and uniform sex offender registration system to ensure that
offenders could not evade requirements by moving between states,”174 and that
excepting all pre-Interim Rule travel from the registration requirement would
defeat this purpose by allowing many sex offenders to slip through more
loopholes.175
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to
directly address the subsection (d) interpretation issue in United States v.
Madera.176 Agreeing with Kapp, the court concluded that subsection (d)
contains two clauses—the first “gives the Attorney General the power to
determine whether SORNA applies retroactively . . ., and the second gives
[him] the authority to promulgate rules regarding initial registration.”177 The
Madera court focused specifically on the language, “the Attorney General
shall have the authority,” finding that “Congress’s use of the word ‘shall’
indicates that Congress was issuing a directive to the Attorney General
specifically to make the [retroactivity] determination.”178 The court found
support for its holding in the very language of the Interim Rule, which stated
that SORNA applies to all previously convicted sex offenders.179 The court
reasoned that if SORNA were retroactive on the day it was enacted, the
Attorney General would not have been compelled to issue the Interim Rule in
the first place.180 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the tension between the
text of subsection (d) and its heading, but did not find any ambiguity in the
text that necessitated consideration of the heading.181
By contrast, three of the six circuits that have addressed this issue since the
Eleventh Circuit’s Madera decision have agreed with the Beasley reasoning
and concluded that subsection (d) applies exclusively to previously convicted
sex offenders who were initially unable to register in their jurisdictions.182 In
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. 528 F.3d 852 (11th Cir. 2008).
177. Id. at 858.
178. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 858 (citing the codified rule at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2008)).
180. See id.
181. See id. The facts of Madera are unique because the defendant was convicted at the
district court level before the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule. Id. at 857. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed the conviction because it found that the lower court impermissibly
“undertook a statutory construction analysis” by declaring SORNA’s retroactivity without
waiting for the Attorney General to issue the Rule. See id.
182. See United States v. Samuels, 319 F. App’x 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 932 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009); United
States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912,
918 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). But see United States v. Hatcher, 560
F.3d 222, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dumont, 555 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.),
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United States v. Hinckley, the Tenth Circuit concluded that subsection (d)
could reasonably be read to suggest two different interpretations: (1) that
Congress gave the Attorney General broad authority to explain whether all
past offenders must register as well as how offenders who were initially
unable to register should go about registering, or (2) that Congress limited the
Attorney General’s authority to explaining the registration requirements for
past offenders who were initially unable to register.183 Given the ambiguity,
the Hinckley court turned to the heading of subsection (d) and legislative
intent to help clarify subsection (d)’s meaning.184 The court found that the
heading clearly points to the latter interpretation, as it suggests that subsection
(d) relates to those sex offenders who were initially unable to register.185
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit echoed the Beasley court in reasoning that the
latter interpretation is more closely aligned with the legislative intent of
SORNA.186 The court recognized that adopting the former interpretation
would frustrate Congress’s goal of closing loopholes and preventing sex
offenders from evading the system: “Reading subsection (d) to exclude all
previously convicted sex offenders from SORNA’s requirements would, as the
Interim Rule explained, exempt ‘virtually the entire existing sex offender
population.’”187
The appropriate interpretation of the impact of the Interim Rule on both
pre-Act and gap travelers is yet another issue that circuit courts have not
resolved. Moreover, the petition for certiorari in Carr v. United States did not
challenge SORNA’s applicability on the basis of subsection (d); thus, it does
not appear that this issue will be resolved by the Supreme Court anytime
soon.188
V. The Ex Post Facto Challenge to Retroactive Application of SORNA
Where a court has concluded that SORNA is inapplicable to a defendant,
whether on the basis of the meaning of the word “travels” or an interpretation
of subsection (d), it has often declined to address the defendant’s

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 66 (2009); United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 592 (7th Cir. 2008),
cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301);
Madera, 528 F.3d at 858.
183. See 550 F.3d at 932-33.
184. See id. at 933-34.
185. See id. at 934.
186. See id. at 932.
187. Id. (quoting Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 8894, 8896 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007)).
188. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 107.
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constitutional challenges.189 On the other hand, where a court has confirmed
SORNA’s applicability to the defendant, it has turned to the ex post facto
argument.
A. Overview of the Ex Post Facto Argument
The prohibition against ex post facto laws comes from Article 1, Section
9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, which reads, “No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”190 This fundamental principle
reflects the belief that individuals should be able to prospectively shape their
behavior based on the laws known to them at the time they undertake any
action.191 As one court explained, “If all the acts required for punishment are
committed before the criminal statute punishing the acts takes effect, there is
nothing the actor can do to avoid violating the statute.”192 Thus, the
Constitution forbids any law that punishes an act innocent when committed
or imposes additional punishment beyond that which was prescribed at the
time the act was committed.193
The first step in resolving an ex post facto challenge is to determine if a
particular statute is subject to ex post facto review.194 A statute is subject to
ex post facto review if it is punitive in nature.195 If a statute is determined to
be punitive, courts then employ the two-part test set forth in Weaver v.
Graham to determine if the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.196
Under Weaver, a court first asks whether the penal law is being applied
retroactively—that is, whether the individual is being punished for action
undertaken before the law’s enactment.197 Second, a court asks whether the
law disadvantages the individual affected by it.198

189. See, e.g., United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2009).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
191. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301).
192. Id.
193. See United States v. Beasley, No. 1:07-CR-115-TCB, 2007 WL 3489999, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 10, 2007) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-31 (1981)).
194. See United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb.
8, 2008) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)).
195. Id. (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)). An ex post facto
violation occurs when an individual is punished for an act that was innocent when committed;
thus, statutes that lack a punitive purpose or effect are not capable of violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See id.
196. 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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SORNA defendants have alleged ex post facto violations in one of two
ways: either they have challenged SORNA’s general registration and
notification requirements, or they have challenged prosecutions under §
2250(a) as applied to pre-Act travel and failure to register.199 The crux of the
former argument is that the duty to register amounts to additional
“punishment” beyond what was mandated at the time the defendant committed
the underlying sex offense.200 Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith v. Doe,201 discussed below, this argument has proven wholly
unsuccessful.202 The latter argument, on the other hand, has yielded
conflicting decisions among courts. According to this argument, the Ex Post
Facto Clause is violated when all of the acts proscribed by SORNA—travel
and failure to register—occurred prior to its enactment.203
B. Smith v. Doe: The Supreme Court Determines That Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Requirements Are Not Punitive
As district and circuit courts alike have grappled with the ex post facto
implications of SORNA, many have turned to Supreme Court precedent to aid
in their analyses. The most recent Supreme Court case to address a sex
offender registration law is Smith v. Doe.204 The respondents in the case took
issue with an Alaska statute that required sex offenders to verify and
periodically update their information.205 Although the respondents were
convicted of sex crimes several years before Alaska passed the sex offender
registration law, the law was retroactive and mandated that they register.206
The respondents sought a declaration that the Alaska statute violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause because the registration requirement constituted additional
punishment beyond what was imposed when they committed their offenses.207
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court never reached the two-part test from
Weaver v. Graham.208 Instead, the Court focused its efforts on resolving the
preliminary matter of whether the Alaska registration requirement was subject
199. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936-37 (10th Cir. 2008) (challenging
both his prosecution under § 2250(a) and SORNA’s general registration requirements), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
200. See id. at 936.
201. 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (finding that Alaska’s registration requirement did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the statute lacked a punitive purpose or effect).
202. See discussion infra Part V.C.
203. See discussion infra Part V.D-E.
204. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89.
205. See id. at 90-91.
206. Id. at 91.
207. See id.
208. See Smith, 538 U.S. 84.
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to ex post facto review—an inquiry centered on the punitive nature of the
statute.209 Courts employ a two-step test to assess punitive nature.210 First, a
court asks whether the legislative intent was to impose punishment.211 If a
court determines that the legislative intent was nonpunitive, it next asks
whether the statute is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
legislature’s] intention to deem it civil.”212
Using the two-step test, the Court in Smith v. Doe began by exploring the
Alaska legislature’s intent in enacting the sex offender registration statute.213
Stating that the proper classification of a statute is “first of all a question of
statutory construction,” the Court first considered the text and structure of the
statute.214 The Court noted that the stated purpose of the statute was to protect
the public from reoffending sex offenders215 and determined that imposing
certain restrictions on sex offenders achieves a public protection purpose that
is “a “legitimate nonpunitive government objective.”216 Additionally, the
Court observed that the notification provisions of the statute were located in
Alaska’s Health, Safety, and Housing Code,217 as opposed to the criminal
code, and that the Department of Public Safety, a department responsible for
both criminal and civil regulatory laws, was charged with promulgating new
regulations to implement the notification procedures.218 Finally, the Court
highlighted the absence of procedural safeguards usually associated with
criminal laws.219 Given these factors, the Court concluded that the legislature
intended to enact a civil regulatory scheme.220
Because the Alaska legislature intended to enact a nonpunitive statute, the
Supreme Court next asked whether the effects of the statute rendered it
punitive.221 Here, the Court noted that only the “clearest proof” would negate
the Alaska legislature’s civil intent.222 The Court employed the seven-factor
effects test articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, but focused on only
209. See id. at 92.
210. See id. A statute is considered punitive if it fails either prong of the test. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361
(1997)).
213. See id.
214. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
215. Id. at 93.
216. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363).
217. Id. at 94.
218. Id. at 96.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 97.
222. Id. at 92 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
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five of the factors: (1) Has the regulatory scheme been traditionally or
historically regarded as punitive in nature? (2) Does the law impose “an
affirmative disability or restraint”? (3) Does the law “promote the traditional
aims of punishment”? (4) Does the law exhibit “a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose”? and (5) Is the law “excessive with respect to [that]
purpose”?223
With respect to the first factor, the Court noted that sex offender
registration laws are relatively new in origin; thus, they have not traditionally
been regarded as a punishment.224 Additionally, the Court rejected the
argument that sex offender registration laws “resemble shaming punishments
of the colonial period,”225 stating that unlike the stigma generated through
traditional shaming punishments, any “stigma” that arises from a public
registration system is merely a “collateral consequence of a valid
regulation.”226 Second, the Court found that the law imposed no physical
restraint and only minimal affirmative obligations.227 Third, the Court
determined that although the statute arguably served the goals of deterrence
and retribution, those effects were only collateral to the chief purpose of
public safety.228 Fourth, the Court found that the statute was rationally related
to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety because it notified the public about
the presence of sex offenders in the community.229 Finally, the Court held that
the registration requirements—including their duration—were not excessive
in relation to the purpose of public safety.230 Specifically, the Court reasoned
223. Id. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). The
Court did not consider the remaining two factors, stating,
The two remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors—whether the regulation comes into
play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime—are of little weight in this case. The regulatory scheme applies
only to past conduct, which was, and is, a crime. This is a necessary beginning
point, for recidivism is the statutory concern. The obligations the statute imposes
are the responsibility of registration, a duty not predicated upon some present or
repeated violation.
Id. at 105.
224. Id. at 97.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 99.
227. See id. at 99-101. The Court rejected the argument that mandatory registration and
publication of sex offender information impose a restraint on the offender’s ability to seek
employment or obtain housing, finding that “these consequences flow not from the Act’s
registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of
public record.” Id. at 101.
228. See id. at 102.
229. Id. at 102-03.
230. See id. at 103-05.
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that the high rate of recidivism and mobility among sex offenders necessitated
wide dissemination of sex offender information for a prolonged period of
time.231 Ultimately, because the application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors
did not produce clear proof of punitive effects, the Supreme Court determined
that the Alaska statute was a nonpunitive regulatory law.232
C. The Impact of Smith v. Doe on Challenges to SORNA’s Registration and
Notification Scheme
Prosecutors have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to utilize the
analysis from Smith v. Doe to explain why the retroactive application of
SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. To the extent that
defendants have challenged only the registration and notification provisions
of SORNA—and not the penalty provision—prosecutors have been
successful.233 Courts have focused on the apparent similarities between
Alaska’s registration requirements and those of SORNA, and have concluded
that the retroactive application of SORNA’s registration requirements does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
For example, in United States v. Hinckley, the defendant challenged
SORNA’s “overall applicability” by arguing that its registration requirements
increase punishment retroactively.234 In making this claim, the defendant
attempted to distinguish SORNA’s registration requirements from those in
Smith v. Doe to show that SORNA is a punitive statute.235 The defendant cited
such factors as mandatory internet dissemination of offenders’ information,
the community notification requirement, and the possibility of felony criminal
penalties as proof that SORNA was intended to be more than just a civil
regulatory scheme.236 The Tenth Circuit, however, noted that the express
legislative objective was to “protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children,” a purpose more indicative of a civil intent than a
punitive one.237
231. See id.
232. Id. at 105-06.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that attack
of SORNA’s registration requirement is not viable in light of Smith v. Doe), cert. granted sub
nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301); United States
v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (declaring that SORNA is still a civil regulatory
scheme despite using criminal penalties to further its objectives), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383
(2009); see also United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2431 (2009); United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560, 565 (S.D.W. Va. 2007).
234. 550 F.3d at 936.
235. See id. at 937.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Next, the Hinckley court asked whether SORNA’s effects are so punitive
as to nullify the civil legislative label.238 Here, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged that SORNA contains a criminal penalty for failure to register,
but noted that “invoking the criminal process in aid of a statutory regime does
not render the statutory scheme itself punitive.”239 Furthermore, the court
dismissed as insignificant the placement of SORNA’s penalty provision within
the criminal code, attributing more significance to the placement of SORNA’s
registration provisions under the civil heading of “public health and
welfare.”240 Finally, the court echoed Smith v. Doe in concluding that any
public shame associated with the dissemination of sex offender information
is “but a collateral consequence” of the law’s public protection objective.241
Ultimately, the court found that SORNA’s chief purpose—to inform the
public about the presence of sex offenders—outweighs any punitive effects
that arise from its penalty provision.242
D. Smith v. Doe’s Influence on Challenges to SORNA’s Penalty Provision
Although Smith v. Doe has largely precluded challenges to SORNA’s
registration and notification provisions, the result has been different for
challenges to prosecutions under SORNA.243 For example, in United States
v. Smith, the defendant argued that prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 on the
basis of his pre-Act interstate travel violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because
it subjected him to additional punishment beyond what was prescribed when
he traveled and failed to register.244 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan concluded that the facts of the case were
distinguishable from Smith v. Doe.245
The court began by contrasting the placement of SORNA’s penalty
provision in Title 18 of the United States Code, “Crimes and Criminal
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003)).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 937-38.
242. See id. at 938.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *4 (S.D. Ala.
Feb. 8, 2008) (finding that the “government’s reliance on Smith is misplaced because the case
only addresses whether sex offender registration and notification statutes are subject to an ex
post facto challenge”); see also United States v. Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (D.V.I.
2008); United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
244. 481 F. Supp. 2d at 851. At the time of the defendant’s travel in 2004, the law capped
his potential incarceration at one year. See id.; see also Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(4)
(2000). SORNA increased the maximum incarceration to ten years. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C.
2250(a) (2006).
245. See Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
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Procedure,” with the placement of the Alaska statute’s registration
requirement in Alaska’s civil code.246 The court also pointed to the substantial
statutory penalty of up to ten years imprisonment for failure to register as
evidence of punitive intent.247
Finally, the court distinguished the case from Smith v. Doe on the basis of
the particular challenge raised.248 In Smith v. Doe, the respondents were not
convicted under Alaska’s statute; they merely sought a declaration that the
registration requirement was not applicable to previous sex offenders.249 By
contrast, the defendant in United States v. Smith was convicted under SORNA
and challenged the imposition of criminal penalties for travel that occurred
before the statute’s enactment.250 Given the numerous differences in the facts
of Smith v. Doe and United States v. Smith, the court in United States v. Smith
ultimately concluded that § 2250 constitutes a punitive statute for purposes of
an ex post facto challenge.251
Conversely, a handful of courts have considered prosecutions under
SORNA analogous to the situation in Smith v. Doe.252 Unlike the court in
United States v. Smith, these courts have failed to recognize a meaningful
distinction between the challenge mounted in Smith v. Doe and the way in
which SORNA defendants have challenged § 2250. Instead, these courts have
focused on the similar objectives of the Alaska statute and SORNA and have
concluded that the common public protection purpose renders the statutes

246. See id. at 852-53.
247. See id. at 853. The court highlighted the shift in classification of the offense from a
misdemeanor to a felony as additional proof of punitive intent. See id.
248. See id. at 852.
249. Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003)).
250. Id. at 847-48. The court in United States v. Beasley elaborated on this crucial
distinction:
[W]hile Smith v. Doe stands for the proposition that Defendant could be required
to register in Georgia without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, it does not
answer the question of whether he can be prosecuted for his interstate travel and
failure to timely register after he arrived in Georgia.
2007 WL 3489999, No. 1:07-CR-115-TCB, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2007).
251. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, No. 1:07-CR-73, 2007 WL 3256600, at *3 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 2, 2007), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301);
United States v. Hulen, No. 07-30004, 2007 WL 2343885, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 15, 2007),
rev’d, 309 F. App’x 79 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Manning, No. 06-20055, 2007 WL
624037, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 23, 2007); United States v. Templeton, No. CR-06-291-M, 2007
WL 445481, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2007); United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257,
1264 (M.D. Fla. 2007), rev’d, 528 F.3d 852 (11th Cir. 2008).
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sufficiently similar to warrant comparable treatment.253 In essence, these
courts have suggested that Smith v. Doe precludes any ex post facto challenge
to a sex offender registration law, regardless of the context in which it is
raised.
E. SORNA and the Weaver Two-Prong Test
Recall that the punitive-intent analysis resolves only the preliminary matter
of whether SORNA is subject to ex post facto review.254 While the first courts
to address ex post facto challenges seemed to rely extensively on the Smith v.
Doe analysis,255 courts have recently shifted away from Smith v.
Doe—reflecting their implicit acceptance of the SORNA penalty provision’s
punitive nature—toward the two-part test from Weaver v. Graham to
determine whether SORNA’s retroactive application actually violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause.256
According to the Weaver test, “[T]wo critical elements must be present for
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it
must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage
the offender affected by it.”257 These elements are discussed in reverse order,
as the first element has proven much more controversial in the context of
SORNA litigation.
The requirement that the law disadvantage the offender has been interpreted
to mean that the law either changes the definition of criminal conduct,
criminalizes conduct that was innocent when committed, or increases
punishment beyond what was in place when the law was broken.258 No
SORNA defendant can reasonably argue that the law criminalizes behavior
that was innocent when committed, given that every state and the federal
government maintained sex offender registration laws before SORNA’s
enactment.259 Defendants have, however, been able to successfully show that
SORNA increases the punishment for the crime of failing to register.260
While the Wetterling Act fixed the maximum penalty for a first-time failure
253. See, e.g., Hulen, 2007 WL 2343885, at *2.
254. See United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Feb.
8, 2008) (concluding that § 2250 is a punitive statute and therefore “subject to . . . ex post facto
challenge”).
255. See, e.g., Hulen, 2007 WL 2343885, at *2.
256. See, e.g., United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009).
257. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citations omitted).
258. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 & n.13 (1997).
259. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *6 (S.D. Ala.
Feb. 8, 2008) (finding that “[t]here is no question that § 2250, which increases punishment for
Kent’s crime by a factor of ten, disadvantages him”).
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to register at one year incarceration, SORNA changed the crime to a felony
carrying a possibility of ten years imprisonment.261 As a result of this
increase, most defendants argue that SORNA disadvantages them because it
imposes additional punishment for the offense of failing to register. Because
this fact is undisputed, courts have spent little time discussing the
“disadvantage” element of the Weaver test.
By contrast, the issue of whether SORNA is “retrospective” has generated
significant debate among federal courts. A penal law is said to be
“retrospective” if all the events necessary to charge an individual occurred
before the law’s enactment.262 Like the justification for the ex post facto
prohibition generally, the justification for this requirement is one of fairness:
if all the events required to charge an individual have already occurred before
a law’s passage, there is nothing the individual can do to avoid breaking the
law.263 On the other hand, if at least one of the acts necessary to charge the
individual occurred after passage of the law, the individual had the ability to
avoid breaking the law, and the fairness rationale is not implicated.264
The controversy surrounding whether SORNA is “retrospective” has little
to do with whether the acts constituting the offense actually occurred.265 That
is, in the ordinary case, the defendant concedes that he was convicted of a
previous sex offense, traveled, and failed to update his registration before
SORNA was passed.266 Instead, the controversy surrounds when the offense
261. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(4) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); see also
supra note 46.
262. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301).
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. It is important to note that the distinction between pre-Act and gap travel is
inconsequential to the ex post facto discussion, as the arguments by both types of defendants
are functionally identical. Pre-Act travelers argue that SORNA satisfies the “retrospective”
requirement because it punishes them for convictions, travel, and failures to register that
occurred before SORNA was passed. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008
WL 360624, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2008). Gap travelers argue that SORNA satisfies the
requirement because it punishes them for travel and failures to register that occurred before
SORNA was made applicable to them through the Attorney General’s rule. See, e.g., United
States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D.R.I. 2008). Assuming that a court determines
that the duty to register did not arise until the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule, the gap
travelers’ argument is, for all intents and purposes, the same as the pre-Act travelers’ argument
that their convictions, travel, and failures to register all occurred before they had a legal
obligation to abide by SORNA’s requirements. In the interest of simplicity, when this comment
hereafter refers to events occurring before SORNA’s enactment, it includes events occurring
before SORNA’s applicability in the case of gap travel.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, No. 3:07-CR-72(01) RM, 2007 WL 4553720, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 578, cert. granted sub nom. Carr, 130 S. Ct. 47.
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itself is completed.267 The classic SORNA case presents the following
scenario: the defendant moved from one state to another and failed to update
his registration before July 2006, then failed to update his registration after
SORNA was passed.268 In this type of scenario, courts have struggled to
determine when the offense of failing to register is completed.269
To avoid a finding that SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause,
prosecutors urge courts to view failure to register as an ongoing offense—an
offense that continues until the individual comes into compliance with
SORNA. Under this view, if an individual fails to register both before and
after SORNA’s enactment, then technically the offense is not “completed”
until the individual decides to register. Courts have disagreed about whether
this is an accurate characterization of § 2250.270
Many district courts have found that failure to register is not an ongoing
offense, basing their conclusion on one or both of two related rationales: (1)
an individual who traveled before SORNA’s enactment committed all of the
acts necessary to establish a conviction for failure to register under the
Wetterling Act after the tenth day of failing to register,271 and (2) failing to
register is distinct from other crimes declared to be “ongoing offenses” for
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.272 For instance, in United States v.
Smith, a district court in Michigan dismissed the ongoing offense
characterization, highlighting the ten-day limit for sex offenders to register
under the Wetterling Act.273 Because an unregistered offender could be
convicted of failing to register on the eleventh day, the court reasoned that the
crime of failure to register, under either the Wetterling Act or SORNA, cannot
267. See id. at *2-3.
268. See id. at *1.
269. See id. at *2.
270. Following is a nonexhaustive list of courts that have concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2250
penalizes an ongoing offense: United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009);
Dixon, 551 F.3d at 582; United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009); United States v. Akers, No. 3:07-CR-00086(01)RM, 2008 WL
914493, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2008); United States v. Villagomez, No. CR-08-19-D, 2008
WL 918639, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 2, 2008). Following is a nonexhaustive list of courts that
have found that § 2250 does not describe an ongoing offense: Kent, 2008 WL 360624, at *8;
United States v. Wilson, No. 2:06-cr-867 TC, 2007 WL 3046290, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 16, 2007);
United States v. Deese, No. CR-07-167-L, 2007 WL 2778362, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21,
2007); United States v. Sallee, No. CR-07-152-L, 2007 WL 3283739, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug.
13, 2007); United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
271. See, e.g., Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 852; Wilson, 2007 WL 3046290, at *2; Deese, 2007
WL 2778362, at *3.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (D.V.I. 2008); Kent, 2008
WL 360624, at *8.
273. 481 F. Supp. 2d at 852; see also 42 U.S.C. § 14072(g) (2006).
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be an ongoing offense.274 In other words, the government had all the “facts”
it needed to support Smith’s prosecution for failure to register before July
2006, illustrating that the offense was completed before SORNA was
enacted.275
In United States v. Kent, the government argued that a violation of § 2250
was similar to a violation of the felon-in-possession statute, which had
previously been declared a continuing offense by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.276 The Eighth Circuit had found that the fact that a felony conviction
predated the felon-in-possession statute was “immaterial” in an ex post facto
challenge, provided that the prohibited conduct—possession of a
firearm—continued after the law was enacted.277 By analogy, the prosecution
in Kent argued that if the felon-in-possession statute is not retrospective even
when it draws on an antecedent felony conviction, SORNA cannot be
retrospective just because it draws on a previous sex conviction.278 The
district court in Kent, however, was quick to distinguish the felon-inpossession case from the SORNA prosecution at issue, noting that the
prohibited conduct in Kent’s case, traveling and failing to update his
registration, both occurred before the law was enacted.279 The court
summarized the difference as follows: “Kent’s ex post facto challenge is not
based on the argument that his prior conviction of a[n] . . . offense occurred
before SORNA was enacted, it is based on the argument that all of the facts
necessary to make the criminal case against him occurred before SORNA was
enacted.”280
The court determined that failing to register as a sex offender is more
comparable to failing to register for the draft.281 The court noted that, similar
to the act of failing to register for the draft,
[t]here is . . . nothing inherent in the act of registration itself which
makes failure to do so a continuing crime. Failing to register is not
like a conspiracy which the [Supreme] Court has held continues as
274. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 852. Interestingly, the court seemed to view the crime of
failure to register in the abstract, rather than as two separate crimes under the Wetterling Act and
SORNA. See discussion infra Part VI.D.2 for further development of this idea.
275. See Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
276. See Kent, 2008 WL 360624, at *8; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (felon-inpossession statute).
277. United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing, inter alia, Brady v.
United States, 26 F.3d 282, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1994)).
278. See Kent, 2008 WL 360624, at *8.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010

308

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:273

long as the conspirators engage in overt acts in furtherance of the
substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.282
While a handful of district courts have held that failure register is not an
ongoing offense, the four circuit courts to address the issue have reached the
opposite conclusion.283 In United States v. Dixon, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals analogized failure to register under SORNA to a prisoner’s
escaping after receiving a two-week furlough.284 While the prisoner is
technically guilty of escape after two weeks of failing to appear, he remains
in violation of the law for the duration of his unauthorized absence.285
Likewise, the court determined that although a sex offender violates § 2250
after three days of failing to update his registration (or ten days in the case of
the Wetterling Act), he remains in violation of the law as long as he fails to
register.286 Interestingly, despite concluding that failure to register is an
ongoing offense, the court nevertheless reversed Dixon’s conviction after
finding inadequate proof regarding the timing of his failure to register.287 The
indictment charged that Dixon failed to register “from on or about February
28, 2007 to on or about April 5, 2007,” but the trial transcript did not contain
any proof that his failure extended beyond February 28, 2007.288 The Seventh
Circuit, after determining that SORNA was not applicable to Dixon until the
Attorney General issued the Interim Rule, held that Dixon was entitled to a
“reasonable time” to register after February 2007.289 Without any proof that
he was given a reasonable time to register, the court concluded that all of the
elements of Dixon’s crime occurred before the law was applicable to him and
that punishing Dixon under § 2250 would run afoul of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.290
The timing issues confronted by the court in Dixon are unique, and most
courts that adopt the ongoing offense characterization also conclude that
282. Id. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 119 (1970)).
283. See United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009).
284. 551 F.3d at 582 (concluding that failure to register is an ongoing offense, but finding
an ex post facto violation because of inadequate proof of failure to register after SORNA
became applicable).
285. See id.
286. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 14072(g), 16913(c) (2006).
287. Dixon, 551 F.3d at 585-86.
288. See id. at 585.
289. See id. at 585-86.
290. See id. at 586.
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punishing pre-Act travel is not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In
United States v. Hinckley, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals revisited
SORNA’s legislative intent to explain why failure to register necessarily
implies a continuing violation.291 Citing Toussie v. United States, the court
stated that an offense is deemed “continuing” when either (a) the language of
the statute expressly designates it as such, or (b) the nature of the crime itself
supports the inference that Congress must have intended for it to be
considered “continuing.”292 The Tenth Circuit noted the absurdity of
Congress’s passing a law, the primary purpose of which was to prevent sex
offenders from evading the system, and then exempting those same offenders
from the consequences of violating the law.293 The court ultimately concluded
that Hinckley’s conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, both
because failing to register is an ongoing offense and because SORNA is a
civil, nonpunitive law.294
As with questions regarding SORNA’s applicability to pre-Act and gap
travelers, courts remain split on the question whether the retroactive
application of § 2250 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Only four circuit
courts have squarely addressed the issue, and while all four courts held that
failing to register is a continuous offense,295 only three found that convictions
did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.296 The other circuit courts to
address SORNA have avoided addressing constitutional questions by
resolving cases on grounds of statutory inapplicability.297 The Supreme Court
will have the opportunity to confront and resolve the ex post facto issue in
Carr v. United States.298
291. See 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
292. Id. (citing Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)).
293. Id. (quoting United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (W.D. Va. 2007), rev’d
sub nom. United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2009)).
294. See id. at 936-38.
295. See cases cited supra note 283.
296. United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 586 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Carr
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301); Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 936;
United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009).
297. See Hatcher, 560 F.3d at 223 (finding that the court “need not reach the[] constitutional
questions because [it] find[s] that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, SORNA’s registration
requirements did not apply to the Appellants at the time they committed the acts giving rise to
their indictments”); United States v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that
“[b]ecause we hold that SORNA does not apply to Husted, whose interstate travel was complete
prior to the Act’s effective date, we need not reach any of the remaining arguments”); United
States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 859 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to address the constitutional
issues after determining that an indictment brought before the Interim Rule was grounds for
dismissal).
298. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 107, at 29-32 (asking the Court to
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VI. Analysis
Because of tremendous inconsistency in the lower federal courts, the
answers to the following four questions raised by the retroactive application
of SORNA remain inconclusive: (1) Does Congress’s use of the present-tense
word “travels” preclude application of SORNA to past travel?299 (2) Was
SORNA retroactive from the date of its enactment, or did the Attorney
General make it retroactive with the Interim Rule?300 (3) Is SORNA punitive
and therefore subject to ex post facto review?301 and (4) Does the retroactive
application of SORNA to a defendant who both traveled and failed to register
before the statute’s passage violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?302
This comment argues that the present-tense word “travels” does not
preclude application of SORNA to past travel because limiting SORNA’s
applicability to future travel squarely conflicts with Congress’s intent in
passing the statute, and because language used in the statute suggests that
interstate travel was intended to be a status, rather than temporal, requirement.
Next, this comment argues that SORNA was retroactive from the date of its
enactment because subsection (d) limits the Attorney General’s authority to
specifying SORNA’s applicability to previously convicted sex offenders who
were not required to register in their states at the time they committed their
sex offenses.
This comment then contends that SORNA’s penalty provision is clearly
punitive in nature, thereby rendering the Smith v. Doe inquiry unhelpful to the
SORNA analysis. Finally, this comment argues that the retroactive
application of § 2250 to pre-Act travel and failure to register does not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause because SORNA is not “retrospective” when applied
to defendants who also failed to register after the statute’s enactment.
A. Limiting SORNA’s Reach to Future Travel Undermines the Purpose of
the Law
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act for the express purpose of “clos[ing]
potential gaps and loopholes under the old law, and generally strengthen[ing]
the nationwide network of sex offender registration and notification
resolve whether failure to register is an ongoing offense).
299. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
300. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
301. See discussion supra Part V.D.
302. See discussion supra Part V.E. Recall that the issues concerning the constitutionality
of SORNA’s retroactive application apply to both pre-Act and gap travelers. See supra note
265.
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programs.”303 Specifically, Congress was concerned with the number of
recorded sex offenders that were able to evade the system by moving to states
with more lenient registration laws.304 Senator Frist summarized SORNA’s
stern message as follows: “If you don’t register, we will find you, and you will
go to jail.”305
The Tenth Circuit, along with several district courts, have all but dismissed
Congress’s objective by limiting SORNA’s reach to individuals who travel
and fail to register after July 2006.306 While it might be tempting to
sympathize with defendants who had no duty to register before SORNA and
were suddenly faced with criminal prosecutions under the new law, these are
not the type of individuals at issue. Rather, the individuals prosecuted under
SORNA had state and federal obligations to register before passage of
SORNA, moved before July 2006, and continually failed to register for
months and even years before and after SORNA was passed.307 Given the
legislature’s intent to combat this type of noncompliance, the decision to
exclude these individuals defies common sense.
Courts like the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Husted have focused
exclusively on Congress’s use of the present tense, concluding that the
deliberate choice to use present tense evidences an intent to target only future
travel.308 This rigid interpretation of the word “travels” not only ignores
SORNA’s intent, but is inconsistent with the rest of 18 U.S.C. § 2250.309 As
303. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:
THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT (SORNA) PROPOSED GUIDELINES
3 (2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/sorna_faqs.pdf.
304. See 152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist).
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., United States v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2008).
307. See, e.g., United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
defendant had a history of noncompliance with sex offender registration laws, having been
charged with failure to register under state law in 2002 and 2004, and most recently under
SORNA in 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009); United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157-JVPCN, 2008 WL 474244, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2008) (stating that the defendant, convicted of
a sex crime in Virginia in 1992, failed to register from October 1998 through November 2006
despite moving to Louisiana sometime before February 2001).
308. See Husted, 545 F.3d at 1243-44; see also United States v. Deese, No. CR-07-167-L,
2007 WL 2778362, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. Sallee, No. CR-07-152L, 2007 WL 3283739, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 13, 2007); United States v. Heriot, Cr. No. 3:07323, 2007 WL 2199516, at *2 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007); United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d
846, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
309. Recall that an individual violates § 2250 if she is required to register under SORNA
because of a previous sex-offense conviction, “travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country,” and fails to register or update her registration
under SORNA. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 110.
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the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, SORNA also applies to one who “enters
or leaves” Indian country, as well as one who “resides” in Indian country.310
The deliberate use of all three verbs suggests that Congress intended to
include within the statute’s reach anyone who has ever lived in Indian
country.311 By targeting both past and future residents of Indian country,
Congress demonstrated its intent to create a status requirement rather than a
temporal requirement.312 As the Seventh Circuit observed, if one interprets
“travels” as a temporal requirement and “resides” as a status requirement, “a
sex offender who has resided in Indian country since long before the Act was
passed is subject to the Act but not someone who crossed state lines before the
Act was passed.”313 This illogical result supports the view that Congress
meant for “travels” to be interpreted broadly, covering the entire spectrum of
travel dates. As the Dixon court noted, “the present tense is commonly used
to refer to past, present, and future all at the same time.”314
Additional support for a broad interpretation of “travels” comes from the
fact that SORNA targets, as the principal evil, the act of failing to register.315
As Judge Posner correctly noted in Dixon, “the statute does not require that
the defendant’s travel postdate the Act, any more than it requires that the
conviction of the sex offense that triggers the registration requirement
postdate it. The evil at which it is aimed is that convicted sex offenders
registered in one state might move to another state, fail to register there, and
thus leave the public unprotected.”316 To put it simply, SORNA does not care
about the interstate travel itself, which merely serves as the jurisdictional
hook. Thus, it makes sense for Congress to use “travels” in the broad
sense—not as a temporal requirement, but as a jurisdictional requirement.
Had Congress purposefully injected time into the statute by writing “traveled”
or “will travel,” it would have suggested that the time of travel was somehow
important to the crime. That Congress chose not to inject time into the statute
is strong evidence that SORNA punishes the act of failing to register and not
the act of travel.

310. United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Carr
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1301).
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. Id. (quoting Coal. for Clean Air v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219, 225 (9th Cir.
1992)).
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-63, 66
(discussing the legislative history and purpose of SORNA).
316. Dixon, 551 F.3d at 582.
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The Tenth Circuit held that SORNA does not apply to pre-Act travel by
improperly drawing on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Jackson.317 The statute in Jackson punished any person who “travels” in
foreign commerce and “engages” in illicit sexual conduct.318 The Ninth
Circuit interpreted the word “travels” to reach only post-enactment travel.319
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the use of the present
tense throughout the entire statute.320 Specifically, the court reasoned that the
phrase “engages in any illicit sexual conduct” necessarily applied to acts
occurring after the statute’s enactment.321 Otherwise, the court explained, the
Ex Post Facto Clause would be implicated because both the defendant’s travel
and the sexual act occurred before the law’s passage.322 Because Congress’s
use of the word “engages” represented a deliberate attempt to preclude past
acts, consistency of interpretation demanded a similar interpretation of
“travels.”323
Husted overlooked the key distinction between SORNA and the statute in
Jackson: the statute in Jackson had to be interpreted to require future travel
to avoid an ex post facto violation. SORNA does not. That is, the element of
failing to register is distinguishable from the element of engaging in sexual
conduct because it is something that can be accomplished over time; the
offense is potentially ongoing. Accordingly, the phrase “fails to register”
could be interpreted to include a failure beginning before SORNA’s enactment
but continuing after its enactment without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Because SORNA need not be interpreted to require future failure to register
to avoid the possibility of an ex post facto violation (unlike the situation in
Jackson), an interpretation of “travels” that encompasses only future travel
should not be mandated.
Congress’s use of the word “travels” should not be interpreted to exclude
pre-Act travelers from SORNA’s reach. SORNA’s language encompassing
one who “resides” in or “enters or leaves” Indian country demonstrates that
“travels” was intended to be a status requirement, rendering the time of travel
irrelevant. This interpretation is logical, as SORNA does not criminalize
interstate travel; rather, it criminalizes the act of failing to register. Moreover,
unlike with the foreign sexual conduct statute at issue in Jackson, a limited
317. See United States v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1244 (citing United States v. Jackson, 480
F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007)).
318. See 480 F.3d at 1015 n.1, 1020 (discussing 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) (2000 & Supp. 2003)).
319. See id. at 1020.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
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application to future travel is not necessary to avoid an Ex Post Facto Clause
violation.
B. A Careful Examination of the Rest of SORNA’s Language, Subsection
(d)’s Heading, and Legislative Intent Resolves Subsection (d)’s Ambiguity
in Favor of Application Only to Past Sex Offenders Who Were Initially
Unable to Register in Their Jurisdictions
The language of subsection (d) suggests two possible interpretations: either
the Attorney General’s authority to specify SORNA’s retroactivity extends
only to previously convicted sex offenders who were unable to register when
they committed their offenses, or his authority extends to all previously
convicted sex offenders, including those who were initially unable to
register.324 An examination of the rest of SORNA’s language, subsection (d)’s
heading, and legislative intent resolves the ambiguity in favor of the former
interpretation.
Courts have avoided looking beyond the text of subsection (d) by simply
concluding that it is not ambiguous.325 This conclusion ignores the fact that
valid arguments exist for both interpretations. The proponents of the “twogroup interpretation,” which holds that Congress delegated to the Attorney
General the authority to specify whether all past offenders must register and
to promulgate registration rules for past offenders and offenders initially
unable to register, have a legitimate argument that subsection (d)’s sentence
structure supports their interpretation, as the comma could be seen as a
separation between two clauses that serve different functions.326 The two
clauses have different verbs that seem to refer to different groups—“specify”
refers to past offenders, while “prescribe” refers to past offenders and other
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006); see also discussion supra Part IV.C.
325. See, e.g., United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cole, No. 07-cr-30062-DRH,
2007 WL 2714111, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2007); United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d
560, 568-69 (S.D.W. Va. 2007); United States v. Heriot, Cr. No. 3:07-323, 2007 WL 2199516,
at *2 (D.S.C. July 27, 2007); United States v. Muzio, No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 WL 2159462,
at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2007); United States v. Smith, 528 F. Supp. 2d 615, 619 (S.D.W. Va.
2007); United States v. Kapp, 487 F. Supp. 2d 536, 542 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
326. Recall that subsection (d), captioned “Initial registration of sex offenders unable to
comply with subsection (b) of this section,” reads as follows:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before [the enactment
of this Act] or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules
for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex
offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
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offenders initially unable to register—and it could be argued that the twogroup interpretation is necessary to give full meaning to both clauses.
Additionally, proponents of the “two-group interpretation” have a strong
argument that subsection (d) contemplates two groups of offenders based on
the use of the words “any such” and “other categories.”327 These words could
indicate that past sex offenders are one group contemplated by the law and
that other offenders initially unable to register are another group.
On the other hand, proponents of the “one-group interpretation” have a
strong argument that the last half of the sentence suggests that the drafters
targeted a single group of offenders who were initially unable to register.328
The phrase “and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex
offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply
with subsection (b)” could be interpreted as listing previously convicted sex
offenders as an example of one category of persons that is part of the larger
group of persons initially unable to register.329 The words “and for other
categories” suggest that sex offenders convicted before July 2006 may be
included within this larger group if they were initially unable to register.330
As the Tenth Circuit noted in Hinckley, “Statutory construction . . . is a
holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law.”331 A search for “compatability” between one interpretation
of subsection (d) and the rest of SORNA requires careful consideration of the
language used in other subsections. In his dissenting opinion in United States
v. Hatcher, Judge Shedd correctly observed that other sections of SORNA
strongly suggest an intent to reach pre-enactment sex offenders.332 For
example, he noted that subsection (a) requires a sex offender to keep his
registration current, and 42 U.S.C. § 16911 defines “sex offender” as “an
individual who was convicted of a sex offense.”333 According to Judge Shedd,
two observations about subsection (a) point toward the one-group
interpretation. First, the use of the past tense demonstrates Congress’s intent

327. See, e.g., Kapp, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 932 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
330. See id.
331. Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 934 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
332. See 560 F.3d 222, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 232 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16913(c)).
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to capture all sex offenders, irrespective of the dates of their convictions.334
Second, subsection (a)’s directive “is absolute”; that is, Congress provided no
exceptions for previously convicted sex offenders.335 If the use of “was
convicted” was not, in fact, a purposeful attempt to cover prior sex offenders,
Congress could have clarified the language by exempting prior sex
offenders.336 Instead, Congress chose to do nothing, strongly suggesting that
it intended to capture previously convicted sex offenders. Judge Shedd further
observed that both subsections (b) and (c) (requiring sex offenders to register
initially and update their registrations, respectively) employ the same
“absolute” commands, providing no exceptions for prior sex offenders.337
The heading of subsection (d) and SORNA’s legislative intent also clarify
the ambiguity. The heading provides a clear indication that subsection (d)
applies only to individuals unable to initially register, as it reads “Initial
registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) of this
section.”338 The fact that the heading mentions only “sex offenders unable to
comply with subsection (b)” suggests that inability to comply is the sole focus
of subsection (d).339 The legislative intent also supports the one-group
interpretation, as SORNA was designed to close loopholes in the old system
and combat the growing problem of noncompliance.340 Judge Gorsuch noted
the absurd and potentially dangerous result of exempting all previously
convicted sex offenders in his concurring opinion in Hinckley:
Absent some action by the Attorney General, those convicted
before its enactment would never have to register. Quite literally,
a sex offender convicted one day before SORNA’s enactment on
July 26, 2006 of raping a child, and who thereafter serves twenty
years’ imprisonment, would have no obligation to register for the
rest of his or her life, even after leaving prison in 2026. Under Mr.
Hinckley’s reading, then, it might well be the late [twenty-first]
century before all sex offenders must register. The databases
SORNA created for the public and law enforcement would sit idle,
taking decades to be of any meaningful value. Such a regime would
be better described as cursory than comprehensive.341
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).
339. See id.
340. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
8894, 8895 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007).
341. United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 944 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.,
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As Judge Gorsuch correctly observed, Congress’s stated purpose of
“strengthen[ing] and increas[ing] the effectiveness of sex offender registration
and notification for the protection of the public” and “eliminat[ing] potential
gaps and loopholes under the pre-existing standards” would be virtually
defeated had Congress purposely exempted all previously convicted sex
offenders from SORNA’s coverage.”342
Defendants often point to the Interim Rule as proof that SORNA did not
apply retroactively when it was enacted.343 The theory underlying this
argument is that the Attorney General made SORNA retroactive by virtue of
issuing the Interim Rule.344 These defendants have overlooked a critical
portion of the Rule, which reads,
The current rulemaking serves the narrower, immediately
necessary purpose of foreclosing any dispute as to whether
SORNA is applicable where the conviction for the predicate sex
offense occurred prior to the enactment of SORNA. This issue is
of fundamental importance to the initial operation of SORNA, and
to its practical scope for many years, since it determines the
applicability of SORNA’s requirements to virtually the entire
existing sex offender population.345
Two observations about the Interim Rule’s language are worth noting. First,
the language supports the government’s position that the Interim Rule was
merely a clarification of SORNA’s already-established retroactivity, as it does
not contain any language indicating that it “created” or “established” the duty
to register. Indeed, the stated purpose of “foreclosing any dispute” connotes
an intent to clarify an existing obligation rather than create a new duty to
register. One would expect the creation of a new duty to be marked by
forward-looking language, e.g., “from this day forward,” rather than
backward-looking language. Second, the Attorney General’s acknowledgment
that his clarification “determine[d] the applicability of SORNA’s requirements
to virtually the entire existing sex offender population” highlights the
absurdity of exempting this enormous group of sex offenders, whose

concurring), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
342. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 8895.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 856-57 (11th Cir. 2008).
344. See id.
345. Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. at
8896.
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noncompliance with the old law prompted SORNA’s passage in the first
place, from the statute’s reach.346
A closer look at the rest of SORNA’s language, considered in conjunction
with SORNA’s legislative history and subsection (d)’s heading, resolves
subsection (d)’s ambiguity in favor of the view that SORNA was intended to
be retroactive from the day it was enacted. Accordingly, courts should
conclude that SORNA is applicable to sex offenders who moved from one
state to another before the Interim Rule.
C. Reliance on Smith v. Doe Is Misplaced Because SORNA’s Penalty
Provision Is Punitive in Nature
To the extent that a defendant challenges the retroactive application of 18
U.S.C. § 2250, the punitive-intent analysis from Smith v. Doe is superfluous.
The question in Smith v. Doe was whether it was constitutional to require
previously convicted sex offenders to register, given that the obligation did not
exist when they committed their original offenses.347 These defendants were
never prosecuted for failing to register; they merely asked the Court to declare
the registration requirement unconstitutional because it constituted additional
punishment for their original offenses.348 Thus, the punitive-intent analysis
was necessary because it was not immediately clear whether registration and
dissemination of registry information constituted “punishment” within the
traditional meaning of the word.349
The Supreme Court declined to address the appropriate resolution of a
constitutional challenge to Alaska’s penalty provision because this issue was
not on the table.350 Accordingly, any attempt to analogize a prosecution under
SORNA to the facts of Smith v. Doe is misguided. SORNA defendants do not
challenge the mere obligation to register; they challenge their federal
prosecutions for failing to register. Unlike the registration and notification
provisions in Smith v. Doe, § 2250 is clearly a punitive statute—its sole
purpose is to penalize noncomplying sex offenders with a maximum of ten
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See id. (emphasis added).
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89, 92 (2003).
See id. at 91.
See id. at 91-92.
See id. at 101-02. The court found that
[a] sex offender who fails to comply with the reporting requirement may be
subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure, but any prosecution is a
proceeding separate from the individual’s original offense. Whether other
constitutional objections can be raised to a mandatory reporting requirement, and
how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this
opinion.

Id.
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years imprisonment.351 To conclude that a felony penalty provision constitutes
a civil regulatory law is simply illogical, not to mention unnecessary, because,
as the next subpart contends, failure to register is an ongoing offense for
which the imposition of punishment does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Lower courts’ reliance on Smith v. Doe may stem from the misguided belief
that courts should consider § 2250 in conjunction with SORNA’s general
registration requirements, rather than focusing on § 2250 in isolation.352 The
district court in United States v. Kent dismissed this approach after finding no
authority to support the proposition that a court should consider the broader
context of a statute when determining if a particular penalty provision is
punitive.353 While acknowledging that consideration of the broader scheme
may prove helpful when “reference to the scheme sheds light on whether the
challenged statute subjects a criminal defendant to additional punishment,” the
court found this approach unnecessary for § 2250 because SORNA
indisputably subjects defendants to more severe punishment than the previous
federal law.354
Nonetheless, several courts have seemingly endorsed the broad approach
by discussing SORNA’s general registration scheme—and simultaneously
avoiding its penalty provision—in an attempt to analogize SORNA to
Alaska’s sex offender registration laws.355 For example, in United States v.
Mason, a gap traveler argued that SORNA’s retroactive application effectively
“punishe[d] him for conduct occurring before the SORNA’s enactment.”356
Admittedly, the defendant could have better articulated the challenge, as the
words do not pinpoint precisely what was at issue—whether it was the
retroactive application of the registration provisions or the penalty
provision.357 This imprecision notwithstanding, the fact that he challenged
being “punished” for conduct occurring before SORNA’s enactment strongly
suggests that he took issue with more than just the basic registration
351. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
352. Compare United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *3-4 (S.D.
Ala. Feb. 8, 2008) (holding that § 2250 should be considered separately from SORNA’s
registration requirement), with United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 929-30 (M.D. Fla.
2007) (considering the placement of SORNA’s registration provisions).
353. Kent, 2008 WL 360624, at *4.
354. Id. at *5.
355. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009);
Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 929; United States v. Manning, No. 06-2005, 2007 WL 624037, at
*1 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 23, 2007).
356. 510 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
357. See id.; see also Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 11, Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923 (No.
6:07-cr-52-Orl-19JGG).
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provisions.358 Nevertheless, the court ignored the emphasis on punishment
and proceeded to discuss SORNA’s registration requirements, revisiting the
punitive-intent analysis from Smith v. Doe and resolving that Congress
intended to establish a civil, nonpunitive statute.359
At one point, the court may have alluded to the penalty provision when it
stated, “It is unnecessary to address Defendant’s alternative arguments with
respect to retroactive application in great detail because Defendant is not
being punished for conduct that occurred before SORNA was enacted.”360
Unfortunately, the court did not clarify precisely what those “alternative
arguments” were, nor did it attempt to explain why the retroactive application
of § 2250 was constitutional.361
The Mason court’s unwillingness—or worse, inability—to acknowledge the
distinction between challenges to SORNA’s registration provisions and
challenges to SORNA’s penalty provision is troubling. While it may be true
that the defendant did not precisely identify the particular sections being
challenged, one would expect the court, at the very least, to formally recognize
that a federal prosecution for failure to register is vastly different from a
declaratory judgment action seeking to confirm a law’s inapplicability, such
that a SORNA prosecution cannot neatly fit within the Smith v. Doe mold.
To be sure, the Mason court is not the only court to muddle the issues by
not clearly distinguishing a challenge to SORNA’s registration requirements
from a challenge to SORNA’s penalty provision.362 This disturbing trend
seems to suggest that many courts do not understand the proper role of Smith
v. Doe in a SORNA analysis. As discussed above, the punitive-intent analysis
proves unhelpful when defendants challenge their prosecutions under §
2250.363 Unlike in Smith v. Doe, where there was a legitimate question
whether registration constituted punishment, there is little room to argue that
a statute providing for ten years imprisonment is not punitive.
Moreover, even if courts conclude that Smith v. Doe is the proper starting
place for a challenge to § 2250, there are sufficient distinctions between
Alaska’s sex offender registration law and SORNA’s penalty provision to
warrant disparate treatment. The Kent court noted that contrary to Alaska’s
law, SORNA has three subtitles: “(A) Sex Offender Registration and
Notification; (B) Improving Federal Criminal Law Enforcement To Ensure
Sex [O]ffender Compliance With Registration and Notification Requirements
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
See id. at 929-30.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 923.
See cases cited supra note 355.
See supra text accompanying notes 350-54.
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and Protection of Children From Violent Predators; and (C) Access to
Information and Resources Needed To Ensure That Children Are Not
Attacked or Abused.”364 The court noted that § 2250 falls under Subtitle (B),
just one indication that Congress intended for it to be a criminal, punitive
statute used to enforce “the presumably civil laws passed in Subtitles (A) and
(C).”365
Furthermore, the Court in Smith v. Doe stated that a probative factor in
determining legislative intent is where the legislature opted to codify the
provision in question.366 Because the respondents challenged the Alaska
registration and notification scheme as a whole, the Court focused on the
location of the registration and notification provisions.367 Alaska’s
registration requirement was located in the state’s criminal code, while the
notification requirement was located in the civil code.368 Noting the
conflicting placement of Alaska’s registration and notification provisions, the
Court turned to alternative ways of assessing legislative intent.369
Challenges to prosecutions under SORNA do not present the same
dilemma. Section 2250 is the only provision in question, as defendants do not
challenge the registration requirement itself. The felony failure to register
provision is located in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, “Crimes and Criminal
Procedure,” a fact highly probative of punitive legislative intent.370 The
government may urge courts to consider the fact that SORNA’s registration
requirement is located in a civil title; however, this fact is irrelevant to the
analysis because the registration requirement is not under attack. Much as
Smith v. Doe did not consider the impact of Alaska’s failure-to-register
penalty provision for failure to register because it was not at issue in the
case,371 it is inappropriate for courts to consider the impact of SORNA’s
registration and notification provisions.
In short, Smith v. Doe should not play a role in assessing ex post facto
challenges to prosecutions under SORNA. Smith v. Doe involved entirely
different circumstances and is not helpful to the analysis. Moreover, it is
inappropriate for courts to examine SORNA as a whole when assessing the

364. United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8,
2008) (referencing subtitles shown in the table of contents to the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 587-88).
365. Id.
366. 538 U.S. 84, 94 (2003).
367. See id. at 91, 94.
368. Id. at 94.
369. See id. at 95-96.
370. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
371. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94.
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punitive nature of § 2250. Section 2250 is a punitive statute, as illustrated by
its placement within the federal criminal code, its location in a subtitle of the
Adam Walsh Act entitled “Improving Federal Criminal Law Enforcement To
Ensure Sex Offender Compliance With Registration and Notification
Requirements and Protection of Children From Violent Predators,” and its
potential penalty of ten years imprisonment for failing to register. Instead of
prematurely dismissing SORNA as nonpunitive, courts should concede its
punitive purpose and instead focus on the Weaver test to resolve whether the
retroactive application of SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
D. Retroactive Application of SORNA to Pre-Act Travel and Failure to
Register Does Not Violate the Ex Post Facto Clause Because § 2250 Is Not
“Retrospective” When Applied to Offenders Who Remained Unregistered
After the Statute’s Passage
Recall that under the Weaver two-prong test, the application of a penal law
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the law is “retrospective” and
“disadvantages the offender affected by it.”372 Under Weaver, a law is deemed
“retrospective” if all the events necessary to charge the individual occurred
before the law’s enactment.373 The retroactive application of SORNA to preAct travel is not “retrospective” within the meaning of Weaver for two
reasons. First, failing to register is an ongoing offense, meaning that a sex
offender who fails to register both before and after July 27, 2006, has not
“completed” the act of failing to register before SORNA’s enactment. Rather,
a sex offender who fails to register remains in violation of the law for as long
as he remains unregistered. Second, two of the elements necessary to
establish a conviction under § 2250 are that the offender is “required to
register under [SORNA]” and “knowingly fails to register or update a
registration as required by [SORNA].”374 Logically, an offender is incapable
of being required to register under, and knowingly failing to register under,
a law that was not in existence when he acted. The implication of these two
observations is simple: even if an offender was convicted of the registrationtriggering sex offense, traveled, and failed to register before passage of
SORNA, it cannot be said that the application of SORNA to the offender
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the offender remained unregistered after
SORNA’s enactment.

372. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citations omitted); see also supra text
accompanying note 257.
373. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
374. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1), (3).
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1. Failure to Register Is an Ongoing Offense
An offense is deemed continuous when “the nature of the crime involved
is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a
continuing one.”375 There are two chief reasons why failing to register as a
sex offender constitutes a continuing violation. First, when a sex offender
fails to register, he poses a continuing threat to society. In other words, the
threat to society does not cease after the single act of failing to register occurs
on the fourth day; rather, it continues each and every day that the individual
remains unregistered.376 Second, “Congress must assuredly have intended that
[failing to register] be treated as a continuing [offense]” because the drafters’
express goal of combating noncompliance among previously convicted sex
offenders would not be attained by exempting all defendants who moved and
failed to register before July 2006.377
Some defendants have attempted to analogize failure to register as a sex
offender to the crime of failing to register for the draft.378 In Toussie v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that failing to register for the draft is not a
continuing offense because it does not pose a “renewed threat of the
substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.”379 By contrast, failing to register
as a sex offender does pose a renewed threat to society. When a sex offender
moves to a new state and fails to register, this poses a potential threat to
neighbors, coworkers, and any other person who may come in contact with the
offender but is unaware of the individual’s history. This threat does not cease
on the fourth day of failing to register, but rather, the threat continues to exist
as long as the sex offender remains unregistered. Anyone who doubts this
proposition should consider the continuous threat posed to Maureen Kanka’s
family by an unregistered sex offender who raped and murdered her daughter
two years after moving into their neighborhood.380
A better analogy to failing to register as a sex offender is the offense of
escaping from prison. In United States v. Bailey, the Supreme Court held that
escape from prison is an ongoing offense because the escapee poses a
375. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). This test for “continuous” is one
of two set forth in Toussie, the other being express designation by Congress. Id.; see also supra
text accompanying note 292.
376. Recall that an individual technically violates § 2250 after he fails to update his
registration within three days of changing residence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250; 42 U.S.C. §
16913(c) (2006); see also supra text accompanying note 76.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66, 340-42.
378. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *8 (S.D. Ala.
Feb. 8, 2008).
379. 397 U.S. at 122.
380. See William Glaberson, Stranger on the Block – A Special Report; At Center of
‘Megan’s Law’ Case, a Man No One Could Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1996, at A1.
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continuing threat to society.381 As with prisoners, Congress has determined
that the freedom of sex offenders must be limited in certain ways to avoid
harm to society. By failing to register, these sex offenders function like prison
escapees: they break the chains that society has deemed necessary to protect
others and pose a serious danger to the public.
Another offense similar to failing to register is failing to appear for
sentencing.382 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the failure to appear for
sentencing is continuous for the same reason cited in Bailey.383 Additionally,
the court noted the absence of a separate crime for failing to return for
sentencing after initially failing to appear: “The two actions pose the same
danger to society and the legal system. Both are part and parcel of one
continuing offense.”384 Likewise, there is no separate criminal statute
prohibiting continuing to fail to register after one initially fails to register
within three days of moving. The continuing failure is “part and parcel” of the
offense of initially failing to register. Thus, failure to register should be
treated as an ongoing violation.
Finally, a § 2250 violation should be treated as an ongoing offense because
to hold otherwise would undermine Congress’s reason for enacting the law.
As discussed above, it would have been illogical for Congress to purposefully
increase the punishment for failing to register with the goal of bringing
unregistered offenders into compliance, and then to exempt those same
individuals from the law’s reach.385 To use the Attorney General’s words, a
conclusion that § 2250 describes a one-time offense would exempt “virtually
the entire existing sex offender population.”386
2. A Sex Offender Could Not Fail to Register “Under SORNA” Before
SORNA Was Enacted
Even if a court does not accept that failing to register constitutes an
ongoing offense, it should still conclude that § 2250 is not “retrospective”
because, technically speaking, an individual was not capable of committing
all of the acts necessary to violate SORNA until after the law was passed.
Consider the three facts required to charge a state sex offender under § 2250:
(1) the individual was required to register under SORNA, (2) the individual
traveled in interstate commerce, and (3) the individual knowingly failed to
381. 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980).
382. See United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
383. See id.
384. Id.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66, 340-42.
386. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
8894, 8896 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007).
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register as required by SORNA.387 To say that a particular defendant violated
committed all of the acts necessary to violate SORNA before July 2006 is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, given that it is impossible
to knowingly fail to register under a law that was not in existence when the
failure to register occurred.388
At least one district court has rejected this argument, stating that it
“elevates form over function,” and that “[a] new statutory definition or
categorization for [a sex offender’s] misdeeds does not detract from the proper
focus on the actions [he] took to draw the government’s attention: traveling
in interstate commerce and failing to register.”389 Unfortunately, the Kent
court’s reasoning is divorced from the statute’s language. Kent failed to
recognize that the plain language of SORNA indicates that what is being
punished is not failing to register in the abstract, but failing to register under
SORNA. In other words, § 2250 should not be viewed as merely providing a
new statutory definition of “failing to register,” but instead as creating an
entirely new and separate offense from failing to register under the Wetterling
Act.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Kent court’s understanding
of failing to register under § 2250 provides a defense that is inconsistent with
SORNA’s underlying purpose to those individuals who failed to register
before the statute’s enactment. A simple hypothetical illustrates this point.
Suppose Sex Offender S traveled in interstate commerce in July 2002 and
subsequently failed to update his registration for seven years. In July 2009,
S was arrested for violating § 2250. If a court followed Kent’s guidance in
viewing his failure to register in the abstract, the court would conclude that S’s
failure was completed before SORNA’s enactment and that a prosecution
under SORNA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Sex Offender S would
walk away unpunished. Now Suppose Sex Offender T traveled in interstate
commerce on July 27, 2006, the day of SORNA’s enactment, and was arrested
only seven days later for failing to update his registration. Because Sex
387. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
388. Moreover, because it takes at least four days after changing residence to violate
SORNA, even if an individual moved to a new state the same day SORNA was enacted, the
individual would not yet have completed every act necessary to violate the statute until the
fourth day of failing to register. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2006). It should be noted, however,
that a prosecution on the fourth day under this hypothetical fact pattern could implicate the Due
Process Clause, as it is not clear that the defendant would have had a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the law after its enactment. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 585-87 (7th
Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009)
(No. 08-1301).
389. United States v. Kent, No. 07-00226-CG, 2008 WL 360624, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8,
2008).
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Offender T had the misfortune of traveling the day SORNA was enacted, he
would face punishment of up to ten years imprisonment.390 Thus, Sex
Offender S, who failed to register for seven years, would benefit from a
defense, while Sex Offender T, who failed to register for only seven days,
would be punished. Considering that Congress’s chief reason for enacting
SORNA was to crack down on noncompliance among existing sex offenders
and send the message that unregistered sex offenders will be found and put in
jail, the result in this hypothetical is entirely inconsistent with the statute’s
purpose.391
VII. Conclusion
Since SORNA’s enactment in July 2006, over one hundred defendants have
challenged their convictions. These challenges have not been limited to
statutory inapplicability and ex post facto claims; defendants have attacked
SORNA under the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Tenth
Amendment, and the non-delegation doctrine.392 And the arguments continue
to multiply, as illustrated by the emergence of a new argument in 2008
regarding states’ lack of compliance with SORNA.393 Of all these arguments,
however, courts have divided most sharply over SORNA’s applicability and
its potential violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Although SORNA’s language is admittedly ambiguous, courts should be
wary of reaching narrow interpretations without considering the broader
context and purpose of SORNA. Reading “travels” to preclude all pre-Act
travel is not only unfair to SORNA’s legislative intent but also endangers
society by allowing more sex offenders to break the registration laws with
minimal consequences. The same is true of the “two-group interpretation” of
the Attorney General’s Interim Rule. As specifically stated in the Rule, it was
meant to serve as a clarification of SORNA’s already-established retroactivity;
it was not intended to create new obligations to register.
Furthermore, courts should avoid using Smith v. Doe to aid their analyses
of ex post facto claims. Smith v. Doe involved an entirely different statute
and, more important, an entirely different challenge. Instead, courts should
390. This assumes that there would be no due process concerns with a prosecution only
seven days after the statute’s enactment.
391. See 152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist).
392. See cases cited supra note 12.
393. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (addressing
the argument that because New York had not yet implemented SORNA’s requirements into its
registry, the defendant should not have been expected to comply); United States v. Shenandoah,
572 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578-79 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (addressing the same arguments with respect to
SORNA implementation in New York, Pennsylvania, and Florida).
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concede that a statute that prescribes ten years imprisonment for failing to
register is clearly punitive and move on to the more important question:
whether the law punishes individuals for acts completed before its enactment.
After considering the continuous risk to society posed by unregistered sex
offenders and the plain language of § 2250, courts should find that the statute
is not “retrospective” and conclude that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
The bottom line in these cases is simple: The defendants had an obligation
to register as sex offenders before passage of SORNA. When the law was
passed in 2006, they could have updated their registrations in their old states
or registered in their new states, either one of which would have put them in
compliance with SORNA. They chose to do neither. The real question for
courts is whether they want to condone this behavior with a slap on the
wrist394 or send a message that sex offenders who fail to register will no longer
be tolerated. This is the message that SORNA’s drafters intended to send.
Whether it will be delivered is up to the courts.
Terra R. Lord

394. Recall that the Wetterling Act fixed the maximum penalty at no more than one year
imprisonment for a first-time failure to register. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(4) (2006); see also supra
text accompanying note 261.
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